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Revision Commission when the Tort Claims Act o 963 was 
and enacted and continues to a res ct 
governmental tort 1 il l 
This hearing is one of a s s of gs to 
our tee on s aspects of the tort 
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On November 15 we will hear testimony on procedural reforms and 
on December 14 we will meet to hear testimony on automob 
no-fault insurance. 
These and other hearings will form a basis for the interim 
recommendations we intend to make for legislation before the 
next session of the Legislature. We are aware that these problems 
are complex and politically difficult to resolve. Accordingly, 
we ask witnesses to give primary concern in formulating their 
proposed legislative solutions to the public interest, recogniz 
that this may not always coincide with a given profession's best 
interests. 
# # # 
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exercise of the power to govern, should not be 
rev by judges and juries in tort litigation. The 
responded to these decisions by a two-year moratorium 
Law Revision Commiss intensified studies 
3 produced a series of recommendations to 
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ture's cons those recommendations. 
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over Tort Act of 3. Some 
, the a of 
defenses which were not available under the 1923 statute 
A second major legislative initiat the 
of the 1920 1 s where automobile 1 
and developed rather significantly as a result of the 
use of the automobile and a lot of litigation hit the courts on 
It was only proper, as a result of some nat 
made under Secretary Hoover of the 
to make ic entities liable for automobile torts 
that private persons were liable, and that was pas 
Act. 
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seems to ind 
districts 1 
marily as a 
and has been carried over 
, about 1929, as a res 
-- a series of cases 
ured -- leg lation was 
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Court suggests that it might be illegal to pay punitive damages 
under the 
SENATOR RUSSELL: So Utah cannot be 
themselves ? 
PROFESSOR VAN ALSTYNE: That is correct. It 1 s 1 
It is mandatory in Utah to pay the compensatory damages just as 
it is in California, but on punitives, it is optional the 
public entity with a limitation of $10,000 for each instance. 
CHAIRMAN BEVERLY: If this Committee were to broaden 
liab might be those who would be even more 
of it than they are now, Professor. I don't know .•. 
PROFESSOR VAN ALSTYNE: I recognize the 
that you consider that is a counter to perhaps some of 
mation your operning statement. 
CHAIRMAN BEVERLY: The Trial Lawyers 
ASSEMBLYMAN HAYDEN: Further question, Mr. 
CHAIRMAN BEVERLY: Mr. Hayden. 
ASSEMBLYMAN HAYDEN: I just don't understand 
I guess. The employee still is protected then, in a sense, 
if it is opt 1 with the city or county? 
PROFESSOR VAN ALSTYNE: Under Utah law, say a c 
county employee (one of the cases involved police o 
are 
and the was that it's optional to pay, so j went 
against the officer for, I think it was a couple of thousand 
dollars compensatory damages and $10,000 in punitive damages. 
city then elected to pay the $10,000 punitives addit 
to the compensatory, but it is purely elective, 
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and California. The only difference being that in Utah the city 
could pay the damages, but California apparently could not 
do so under the law. 
ASSEMBLYMAN HAYDEN: No punitive damages are in 
California and the officer could be held liable then in that 
situation personally. 
PROFESSOR VAN ALSTYNE: And the amount of the punitive 
damages is in the discretion of the jury. They would be very 
large indeed. 
CHAIRMAN BEVERLY: Mr. McVittie. 
ASSEMBLYMAN McVITTIE: I have a number of questions 
I'll start from the beginning and then bring them up to date. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Could I just ask one question 
that, to clear that up? 
CHAIRMAN BEVERLY: A ight. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Then is that based upon a c act 
by the plaintiff against the officer? 
PROFESSOR VAN ALSTYNE: That is correct. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: So that's a separate deal. 
PROFESSOR VAN ALSTYNE: The injured person sues the 
officer, recovers damages which include punitive damages .. . 
SENATOR RUSSELL: But that's a civil action, not .. . 
PROFESSOR VAN ALSTYNE: It's a civil action, not a 
criminal case, and the compensatory damages mus pa by 
city in California as well as in Utah. The damages 
which are ied and determined separately in the judgment 
are always specified separate in the judgment. They would be 
paid today Utah within the discretion of the if 
-8-
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turn and gets hit from the back, the judgment of the eng 
that that was a safe intersect probably not to be con-
sidered, or reconsidered by juries. Government 
the obligation to insure against a damages that 
interaction of private citizens and government. But 
have notice that changed conditions have the 
so that now that is a dangerous intersection, then some re 
modest and inexpensive precautions can be taken to 
And if government doesn't act reasonably to prevent those 
it seems to me then there is a basis for liability. 
ASSEMBLYMAN McVITTIE: Breaking away from 
and going to the area of the torts of government 
were indicating that generally the government will 
nificat for a civil judgment which does not lude 
damages, and usually provide a defense of the action 
true if the employee completely steps outs the scope 
ies? For example, at what point in time does a 1 
completely abnegate his role as an 
state if there's a manslaughter where he just commits a 
Does the public agency still have a duty to come in and 
that off in all cases? 
PROFESSOR VAN ALSTYNE: Well, 's true that a 
entity has no obligation to defend or pay the j 
officer was not in the course and scope of 
what his scope and course of employment is is a d 
0 
? 
question which is often a mixed question of law and fact. Let 
me give you an illustration of a case went before the 
States Supreme Court quite recently It involved a 1 o 
1 to 
as the case 
• 
I 
this involving public officials brought against city of 
Los Angeles. Mrs. Brock was at home one day and the 
on the door was a meter reader there from the 
Angeles Department of Water and Power. He was 
of Los 
orders to read the meter, but he was also under orders that 
the householder refused to allow him to come into read the 
meter, he was to leave. He was not to make an effort to 
obtain entry of the home. He was to leave and then the 
ment would simply average the meter reading. Then it be 
up to the householder to demonstrate if the bill was excess 
In this case, however, the meter reader violated his orders in 
absolute insubordination of explicit orders given to He 
entered the house, beat up the householder -- he just got mad 
at her -- then read the meter, then left. The question 
the court was argued that he was out of the course and s 
of employment because once he had violated his , s 
into the house, he was on a detour of his own, and that 
him out of the course and scope of employment. But the Ca for-
nia Supreme Court in the rough case just almost 
contention. Of course he 1 s in the course and scope of 
employment, even though he was in direct violation of s 
orders. The point is that it is very fficult to get a 
holding from the courts today, as I read the cases, 
at the 
practically no holdings that an officer was act of the 
course and scope of his employment where there is 
relationship to the carrying out of his official funct 
So the indemnification provision is very broad and covers 
almost all of . . . 
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McVITTIE: So terms of representation 
comes to d of 's a 
they a e 
VAN ALSTYNE: Not under Cali law. At 
ent time i if the off the 
of Now if the c council 
ASSEMBLYMAN McVITTIE: That's the issue, course and 
PROFESSOR VAN ALSTYNE: Then the city has to make the 
two things: e 
of r , in 
can offer a de 
case they will o 
e 
fense but reserve the right to try to establish, the 
t 0 that was not in 
McVITTIE: can bi that sue 
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own 
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course and s 
PROFESSOR VAN ALSTYNE: Now as a practical matter in 
talking to some city attorneys, my understanding 
many cases where there is a doubtful question as to 
ought to defend or not because of that issue of whether 
he's in the course and scope of the city, as a matter of 
personnel relations or because it may even have engaged a 
agreement with a public employees union, 11 provide the 
defense without asking for a reservation of rights. Once 
decide to provide the defense, then the city must pay the 
full cost of the defense and pay the judgement whether or not 
the officer was in the course and scope of employment. It 
makes no difference. 
ASSEMBLYMAN McVITTIE: One final question, one 1 
area ... Because I want to get in the statutes later on. I 
think there's a lot of abuse in that area. In terms of 
awards for punitive damages, you are indicating that the 
individual, him or herself, would be responsible for 
And then the agencies in Utah now have discretion to 
for punitive damages. Right now, if the damages are awarded 
by the jury, punitive damages, has a jury received or do they 
receive an instruction in California that in the event that 
punitive damages are awarded, that the agency is not respons 
ble? In other words, do we exclude this information from a 
jury, or are we honest with them, candid with tell 
them who would be paying that judgment? 
PROFESSOR VAN ALSTYNE: I have not seen that question 
litigated in any appellate report opinion, but it is my under-
standing from talking to some city attorneys about this in the 
last couple of weeks that most of the trial courts re 
-21-
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public officials they have a sufficient measure of protection, 
that they should not be -- the best people should not be 
from serving in publ office by fear of 
wrong. 
ASSEMBLYMAN McVITTIE: But when you say that the best 
people should not be deterred, I'm just wondering if at 
you don't encourage public officers to do the job. 
isn't that the purpose of lawsuits, and wasn't that the 
original purpose in England of tort recovery to force people 
to clean up their act, as sort of a punishment initially? 
Certainly that is the basis for strict liability, the courts 
tell us, to improve the products. And generally 
it's to further improvements in the system. And so if 
are responsible certainly they ought to be much more caut 
in carrying out their acts such as police o 
starts shooting or something like that. 
PROFESSOR VAN ALSTYNE: The question is, I 
of means. It's quite true that the tort law genera 
when 
, one 
regarded as one means for trying to induce people to act more 
carefully and more circumspectly and to carry out the law . 
It's not the only means available. The fact that the 
entity pays the judgment means that there's a financ 1 
inducement to the public entity to supervise officers 
employees more carefully. And if a public ent f 
a particular officer is risk prone, or is one cons 
a source of lawsuits and claims~ for example, a police officer 
who may be shown by repeated incidents to have a certa propen-
sity for losing his temper and beating up citizens ••• 
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ASSEMBLYMAN McVITTIE: That's a going point. You're 
we never e a j first place as to who would 
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CHAIRMAN BEVERLY: Let s 
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PROFESSOR VAN ALSTYNE: I don't 
constraints are, but I'd be delighted tOo•• 
ASSEMBLYMAN McVITTIE: He's a super 
1 area 
s. 
CHAIRMAN BEVERLY: I know that. That's why we 
him here. Go ahead with your entation. 
PROFESSOR VAN ALSTYNE: Mainly if I may just up 
of some thoughts. I am to 
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PROFESSOR VAN ALSTYNE: I think there are a number 
cases you can find in the in which 
deserving claims have lost for 
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CHAIRMAN BEVERLY: You were (BLANK TAPE) .. claims 
Inc 1 I I introduced a b 1 year that, 
but didn't get far. 
PROFESSOR VAN ALSTYNE: The present 
of complicated, and by the way, I I becomes a for 
litigant and sometimes for the unwary 
f to the more than after 
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d have a 
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RUSSELL: To answer to my speci c ques 
be "yes". 
VAN ALSTYNE: Yes, I think that correct. 
RUSSELL: As to the charity for the 
PROFESSOR VAN ALSTYNE: As a matter of fact on the 
1 
, one 
because the 
are not 
ent 
of 
s 
even go so as 
damages are 
are 
from the 
ed on the moral not if 
pa and 
llar value assoc 
is almost le to ass 
and 
s to jur person 
ace much would for 
for the rest of your 1 ? That 
a discret 
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• 
the emo of the juries become involved that the appel 
courts have established rules that say that if the damages are 
so out of 1 with normal exper as to show 
pass 
judges 
ud 
requ 
, why the courts will reverse or the tr 1 
a remittitur of part of the e 
it's just out of line. 
CHAIRMAN BEVERLY: Could we do that statutorily in 
your opinion? 
PROFESSOR VAN ALSTYNE: Well, in governmental torts, I 
believe you could. 
CHAIRMAN BEVERLY: Because of the const 1 
provision that ex ts? 
PROFESSOR VAN ALSTYNE: Because of the constitutional 
provision. I have some doubts as to whether that be 
possible normal general tort field, but personally, I 
would tend to resolve those doubts in favor of saying the 
legislat in this area is probably suffic to 
the 
CHAIRMAN BEVERLY: Mr. McVittie had a question. 
ASSEMBLYMAN McVITTIE: Just a couple of things that 
somewhat bother me, Professor. In terms of the concept 
I think there are competing social goals. On the one hand we 
want to cut down the cost of government, and on the other hand 
I think we would all agree that one of the greatest things about 
this country is the superb system of justice we have where people 
do have recourse through the courts to get a fair shake when they 
have a grievance or a loss. If we're saying that if a city 
employee hits somebody in an intersection and the city employee 
is negligent and the other person, let's say, loses their legs 
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's are burned 
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drast so that 
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we have 
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we real 
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those rights to 
social policy 
the cost 
1 
PROFESSOR VAN ALSTYNE: Yes. I 
of issue that address. But I 
out that I'm not the 
ASSEMBLYMAN McVITTIE: What 
them their d 
care, and so 
ability to use those 
1 costs 
the terms of 
for recreat 
s 
Isn't that the 
that s 
allow 
ses future 
t's , the 
1 purpose. Let's say 
the ability to have sex. If a person 
there may not be ss 
organs, 
lved. Am I correct? 
PROFESSOR VAN ALSTYNE: Yes, 's correct. 
question is a 
no quest 
risks of soc 
situations 
di question of soc IS 
The problem 
we 
Tort Act 
judgments of the very that you're suggest 
are certain 
are certain 
has made 
of 
no liabil For 
maimed by another pr 
course whatever. 
a 
most cases 
ASSEMBLYMAN McVITTIE: That 
make it right. 
(BLANK TA.PE) 
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beaten up and 
is just no re-
But doesn't 
• 
• 
PROFESSOR VAN ALSTYNE: 
levels of people from •.. 
••. a reflect d 
ASSEMBLYMAN McVITTIE: Let me po out Professor, I 
agree what 
economic costs of 
are proposing certa 
system of justice we have 
the 
because 
there's less outgo for the so-called pain and suffering and 
non-economic losses. But then once again, if we're allowing 
government to this great advantage to reduce ir costs 
of operation, why shouldn't we do it for corporations and 
businesses in the private sector that really go to support that 
government? 
PROFESSOR VAN ALSTYNE: The primary answer, I ink, 
must be that government performs a variety of different 
functions, not choice, but by a statutory mandate, whereas 
income 
private businesses can choose to get out of the business if the 
cost of doing business becomes too high. And, therefore, in 
effect, since is serving the people because the 
people want e of services to be performed, then the 
question is, to what extent do the people also wish to assume 
the risks of losses upon themselves for these pain and suffering 
losses, or to what extent do the people wish to have those 
absorbed as part of the cost of providing a governmental service? 
I think that it's essentially a policy question. When the risks 
are very widely stributed over society at large and are seen 
to be fairly distributed so the people have a perception at least 
that there's a compensating advantage to them in the sense of 
somewhat lower tax burdens and they are willing to assume the 
risks that they may get involved in a serious injury which causes 
disabling effects and they won't be compensated for pain and 
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CHAIRMAN BEVERLY: Yes, sir. 
PROFESSOR ALSTYNE: In to se, I've already 
perhaps in the offered one I think might us 
considera 
to the fact 
• • • a 
instruct the j 
the present 
value of future 
current 
d 
(BLANK TAPE) 
that 
verd 
of tort 
that 
rela 
to approximate 
s of future earnings and the present 
es over life 
verd is given in expectancy of 
one lump sum. 
by stipulat 
cation. I 
today. I 
Now may be some variations on that. Perhaps 
of counsel particularly there may be some modifi-
that general system as I tand 
t that it would be a very useful exercise 
to examine the consequences of providing for installment payments 
of judgments a case this sort. If there is a life expectancy 
of 20 years and 
but today it's g 
ant ipate the payments over a 20 year period --
in one lump sum, the receipient of the judgment 
receives the 1 amount now and if it's unwisely handled, can 
dissipate it ent The recipient, where the judgment may be 
based on 20 year expectancy, may actually die the next year of 
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dangerous and defective cond ion? 
PROFESSOR VAN ALSTYNE: I think you have it already, 
Ms. Gorman. That , the statute does not a general 
de of not , either or 
notice. The construct notice test, in based upon 
what would ... is the defect sufficiently conspicuous and obviously 
noticeable that a reasonable inspection system have discovered 
it within a reasonable time sufficient to allow some precautions to 
be taken? That's essentially the standard the statute now. 
I don't know how you can draft a more particular standard. 
MS. GORMAN: I was thinking of a more spec standard •.• 
PROFESSOR VAN ALSTYNE: Yes, I'm not sure 
one that would be applicable. I think also, 
can draft 
way, there 
have been some crit I have heard from c that 
have suggested that, 11, gee whiz, if that's what the test is, 
we're going to get out of the notice business. We're not even 
going to try and 11 There's one case that ts they 
must inspect their s 
' c must inspect the sidewalks 
at least once every nine years. But nine years is too long. It 
has to be less than that. I really think these criticisms are 
over-reactions. Let me suggest what I mean. All that's required 
under the 
(BLANK TAPE) 
••• the resources avai le, the magnitude of the task, 
the risk to which the public is exposed and all of the other related 
circumstances. Now if I were a city council, what I think I would 
do in a case of that sort, realizing there's hundreds of miles and 
I have a system of providing water and power and we have meter 
readers out, I'd make meter readers into my city street and 
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sidewalk After all, 're go to cover c 
anyway. Why not just on and it's 
no great add the c 
that that tr to de a 
and they I I most 
cases the jury cons to that kind of 
evidence. But I bel is er to leave the 
rule of construct as it now is drafted the statute, 
and let the 1 and munic state work 
out the rules in a cas se method. It very complicated, 
in my op , to to draft more prec e we now 
have in the statute. 
CHAIRMAN BEVERLY: I remember a lls councilman 
hydrants who wanted an 
be inspected 24 
drawn that would require 
before every fire. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: In earl comments 
you ind 
estate, not pa 
What do you 
in front of a car 
upon his ury, 
to the estate in 
do you advocate? 
te? 
TAPE) 
accrue to the 
ing, certainly not med 1 expenses. 
Some system whereby if a low steps out 
lled that way, which no bearing 
this award -- the benefit -- then accrue 
accident for which he was compensated? What 
PROFESSOR VAN ALSTYNE: I'm not quite clear on the question. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: What I'm saying is a fellow is awarded 
a million dollars, but we're paying it in installment payments 
(BLANK TAPE) 
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PROFESSOR VAN ALSTYNE: 
dollars. A port of that 
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dollars will be for past 
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them any 
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SENATOR RUSSELL: Is there 
he 
, it seems to me upon 
future ends. 
rat for awarding 
front of a -- that's 
PROFESSOR VAN ALSTYNE: Well, that at 
the time of the or judgment, a judgment that the jury had 
to determine what his life was and there's probably 
some evidence on that the record. In the normal course of 
events, that would be what his heirs and family would expect 
would be h dur that of t fe 
expectancies are based upon actuarial statistics. Some 
people will 1 long, some people will live short. But once 
that determination has been made, I think one can take the case 
and make the , that is part of estate, that is part 
of his total assets which have been 
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source 
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'11 come 
It s a CEB 
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If 
best 
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Mr. Moore for the moment Mr. Trout 
Supervisors s Mr. is the 
Couns ? 
MR. Yes, s 
MR. 
subject matter that we are the 
current 
and the status 
public ent 
of alternate 
in some cases 
Superv 
looking 
As 
of counties s 
insurance 
years as the result of 
costs of 
discovered a co 
to 
and 
1 you 
It was our 
soared enormous 
c 
it is for 
some details 
and 
a study 
that, as expected, 
over the 
ed ts, 1 
three 
and the 
upon public entities. Statewide we 
e on our of 
a cost e o imately 264% 
counties, 
premiums in 
the true the past years. This, however, d 
cost of liabil to e publ e we were 
simply only able to 
premiums. We were 
i the r ing cost of insurance 
to uncover the actual cost of uninsured 
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losses. Another 
more and more count 
counties were self-
our study was uncovering the fact that 
are becoming self-insured Only five 
as of 1973-74. self-insured we 
mean a substant 1 retention or deductible level before 
having s of 1976-77 number sed to 
16 and we have that as of the current year--1977-78 
policy year-- there are over 20 count s out of the 58 that are 
self-insured. 
For counties that are se insured, the 16 at least 
for the 1976-77 year, we were able to identify the premium 
increases. However, we were unable to identi the amount and 
number of losses that have incurred in the 
So in effect to give an example of one 
retained levels. 
of what this 
would translate , San ino a three year 
period had an increase insurance premiums of 464%. However, 
of time also had an increase in during the same per 
self-insured retent level of $100,000 se insured retention 
to a million self-
incurred by San Bernard 
they would pay out of the 
incurred and were sett 
retention. So, therefore, every loss 
County under $1 million they pay, 
own funds. losses which 
over $1 million would be covered 
by their insurance carr Therefore, those losses falling 
in the range of $1 to $1 million are losses which, in addition 
to their , have to be carried by the public 
entity. The trend that seems to be occurring for counties is 
that, as I mentioned 
self-insured, and th 
reasons: 
ly, more and more counties are going 
explained by probably one of two 
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1) e they have conscious insurance 
program and feel that is more cost-effect 
risks wh no 
longer can obta at cost and are forced 
into a s 
Supervisors Assoc 
fiscal year, 
trend that we 
ion are uncovering, at t for s current 
le more count are go s 
they also are extremely larger amounts for excess 
so the net 
more for less. 
be that they might some cases be paying 
For example, as I have 20 of our Ad Hoc 
Committee on Tort il 
that available for 
time that report was ... 
that wants 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Does 
you have been g ? 
was I'll have 
later. However, s 
have some of the statistics 
MR. TROUT: Yes, has statistics 73-74 up until 
35 reporting 
to update you counties that ipated in our survey. 
even more on more recent developments, I contacted a cross section 
of counties to obta their most recent premium statistics and 
insurance coverage and we example, 
Mendocino County, ich has approximately 60,000 population, last 
year they paid in excess insurance $8,000 for coverage up to $5 
million. This year they have been given the only quote which 
they can secure that is for $78,000. So we have an increase 
of $70,000 in one year. No change in coverage, no change in 
limits. Last year San Benito County, another small county of 
only 20,000 populatio~coverages totalled for all insurance 
coverages, excluding workers' compensation, was $106,000. This 
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CHAIRMAN BEVERLY: Fine, that's 
I think we're 
upward trend of 
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Counsel's off 
actions. To of expert 
Couns 
, we would have to pay 
somebody more than the and , we 
couldn't hold 
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He'd go off to a better we 
We auto liab ity for all 
non-general fund entities, that is the special districts for 
which the board of body. We have 
a $50,000 deduct The reason is that the special districts 
don't have suffic reserves for catastrophe losses. We carry 
comprehensive general policy for special districts covering such 
things as slip and fall and that's for the same reason -- inadequate 
reserves. We carry an aviation liability policy because for some 
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restrictions or leg lative guides on pr e, but 
with the insurance business we are deal public's 
money and this is something that has got to be looked into 
because otherwise we will have situations such as occurred 
last year where a number of companies went the 
of their agents in many cases and insured with a company that 
was writing at real cut-rate premiums and now 
And these cit have not only been to return 
premium, but they have also got no one to pay ir claims. We 
are here dealing th the taxpayers' money and we ve to 
repond to le insurers on that Now I've 
lastly been asked on what is needed for tort reform. 
Now one of the biggest problems, and again th respect 
for Professor Van Alstyne this morning, is that so many of the 
immunit discusses are us s an 
viewpoint. They be very correct academic law, but now we 
are dealing with the practicalities of the marketplace. We 
want some underwr to come into Cal and 
are going to provide a service for California public entities". 
They will not do that unless they have the chance of making a 
reasonable profit. Now here again the insurance industry is 
much to blame, so are some of the cities. I know in my exper-
ience in public entity insurance I've noticed cases of city 
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plaintiff's attorney makes an offer to the entity to settle for 
$400,000. The city or county attorney will say no way, we are 
going to fight th case. He fights and loses. There 
now the possibility that this keen carrier can come in and 
allege to the city you had opportunity to settle this with 
your self-insured retention, you failed to take that oppor-
tunity, we are now going to see it against you for the entire 
amount of our payment that would not have occurred if you had 
settled on the basis of the first offer. This is something 
that possibly legislative action can correct, but I just pointed 
out that none of the suggestions I have made are really perfect. 
To get down to some practical matters from an insurance viewpoint 
that might possibly make California public entity insurance more 
attractive to carriers, basically some form of immunity unless 
it can be proven that a dangerous defect in public property 
was so self-evident that it would amount to gross negligence 
not to correct it, I'm talking about the situation such as 
Professor Van Alstyne brought out whereby a road perhaps designed 
30 years ago and there's a sudden accident today. If it can be 
proven that there have been a string of accidents at this point, 
then perhaps liability would and should apply. But if this 
accident is the first one at this particular intersection, I 
think that there has to be a degree of immunity. We can't 
take a parallel too far with private enterpreise because if you're 
insuring a factory and you see a defect in a factory driveway, 
you can go in and say close that until it is corrected. A public 
entity cannot do that. It has an obligation provide streets and 
highways and means of communication. It has an obligation to 
enforce the law and it's got to be treated 
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somewhat differently from a private corporation. So, firstly, 
we need some type of immunity for streets and highways or defects 
in public places. Secondly, and perhaps even more important, 
restoration of the discretionary immunity that used to apply 
to public office's in an emergency situation. Naturally this 
is going to be of most importance to police and sheriffs' 
departments. In simple lay language. I'll sum it up. A 
police officer alone at duty at night is attacked by three 
people he has reason to believe are armed. The officer has 
to make a split second decision whether to shoot or not. He 
is doing it for the public good, for the protection of all of 
us and yet when this poor man gets in court, his actions are 
going to be weighed as though he had as much time as the court 
to deliberate. That, in my opinion, is inequitable. Now I'm 
not advocating any type of mayhem or giving officers permission 
to go out and shoot people or giving any public official the 
right to go against the public in any improper way. All I'm 
saying is that we must have some type of legislative requirement 
that a court has to consider the emergency situation under 
which the officer was acting. I'll make a similar situation 
for automobile insurance with regard to use of emergency 
vehicles. At one time, if a police car or ambulance were 
proceeding with proper flashing red lights and siren, there 
was a reasonable assumption that people would get out of its 
way. Today, they are treated as though this fast speed or 
going through stop signs or something all for the common good 
the driver feels that he is being treated just as though he had 
to drive normally. Now possibly that is correct -- I 1 m not 
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addressing it from that point of view. I'm looking at this 
strictly from the point of view of an insurance underwriter and 
with the law as it is today, he is not going to insure emergency 
vehicles if he can possibly avoid it. Lastly, I'll make a point 
regarding arrests and the immunity for sickness and illness of 
of prisoners. At one time this was applied strictly on a common 
sense basis. If the police picked somebody up who was bleeding 
and obviously injured and threw him into the drunk tank,they were 
liable and rightly so. Today, the poor officer may be in a small 
town, two people on duty at night, sees somebody lying drunk in 
the gutter. This poor officer is -- it is almost as though he 
is required to make a full medical examination of the prisoner 
and decide whether or not he is on drugs or various other things 
and if the officer decides wrongly, he is going to be held liable. 
Now it's easy to say that a doctor should always be available. 
In a big city he is. In a little town no way. There are four 
fundamental points of where I think legislative reform is 
necessary if ever we are to entice the private carriers back 
into the California public insurance market. Any questions? 
CHAIRMAN BEVERLY: Does anybody have a question? For 
the record, would you describe a little bit more who you are. 
We have you down here as Municipal Casualty Specialist. 
MR. MOORE: Well, I was in charge for many years of the 
old Pacific Indemnity Company municipal program. I assisted in 
drawing up the first policy ever specially designed for California 
public municipalities. I also devised the first risk management 
programs for public entities in California, and I've been 
associated with California municipal insurance for close to 30 years. 
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CHAIRMAN BEVERLY: Justice Thompson. 
JUSTICE THOMPSON: One of Professor Van Alstyne's 
competitors, a chap called Davis, talks about reaching the issue 
of discretionary immunity by making it a question of law for a 
determination by the court, rather than a jury question and 
resolving it as is done in many other areas of limited judicial 
review of legislative action by saying was there a basis in fact 
for what was done. If that process were to be adopted, would 
that introduce a sufficient element of certainty to alleviate this 
problem to any degree? 
MR. MOORE: Well, yes, in my personal opinion it would. 
But you do have to remember that underwriters would by far prefer 
a piece of enforceable legislation rather than a strict trust on 
judicial immunity. 
JUSTICE THOMPSON: I don't blame them. 
MR. MOORE: See, once again -- Professor Van Alstyne, he 
brought up the subject of punitive damages. Well, the attitude 
of insurance companies is very simple that punitive damages are 
a deliberate act on somebody's part that therefore they should 
not be a subject for a proper insurance, and I might say that 
they are my own personal views. I need hardly remind you 
gentlemen that Professor Van Alstyne went back to English law, 
but the old English name for punitive damages was smart money, 
and I'm afraid if the suggestion that he made was carried out, 
we'd see a lot of very smart plaintiffs trying to collect on it. 
CHAIRMAN BEVERLY: Anything further? Thank you very 
much, Mr. Moore. We'll depart from the agenda here because 
Supervisor Crowley has an engagement that would require her to 
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leave soon. So Barbara Crowley, if you'll come forward. 
MS. BARBARA CROWLEY: Thank you for inviting me today. 
I had f t to turn over to you our liability study from the ad 
hoc committee and was ed that Greg Trout was on your 
this morning and would defer to him answers to questions of the 
analysis after you peruse it. The other reason that Martha 
Gorman tells me I have been invited is because as a layman and a 
county supervisor, non-lawyer county supervisor dealing with the 
fundamentals of this tort problem at the county level, I was a 
member of the California Citizens' Commission on Tort Reform. 
The recommendations made by the Citizens' Commission dealt in 
general terms and in specific areas. Those that discussed govern-
ment tort liability dealt in five areas, two of which I wrote 
dissenting opinions to--the one on the punitive damages and the 
ones on the presentation requirement for tort claims. The reason 
that I did that was that I disagreed with their conclusions for 
these two particulars because of the current state of affa of 
tort law and tort rulings in California. After listening today, 
this morning, and getting the feeling that there was not a problem 
in the general picture, I feel that I would like to reinforce the 
notion that we got from the study that indeed there is a cr is 
in tort law in California and it's a crisis of uncertainty as 
was expressed by the Commission. If, indeed, their suggestions 
in general terms were followed, such as the one on arbitration 
and notification in judicial review and the bifurcation of the 
trials, I feel that our problems at the local government level 
would be ameliorated. However, given this situation that we have 
today, this was the reason that I felt I should write dissenting 
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opinions. The government problems are part of a larger picture, 
we felt, in general tort and the general suggestions made by the 
California Citizens' Commission would do much toward alleviating 
this problem. 
CHAIRMAN BEVERLY: Any questions of Supervisor Crowley? 
Apparently not. Thank you very much. Mr. Werchick, California 
Trial Lawyers Association representative. 
MR. ARNE WERCHICK: I realize it is rather unpopular 
to come in first thing after lunch and speak in favor of liability, 
but I also realize at the outset that I can't pretend to possess 
the type of expertise which Professor Van Alstyne possesses in 
this particular area. I might indicate though that I have spent 
my share of time in courtrooms and in the office involved in 
government liability cases, not only on the state municipal level, 
but also federal tort claims level and also somewhat inspired by 
Professor Van Alstyne's writings on the subject created what I 
understand to be the first seminar program on the subject of 
litigating government claims which I do teach as an assistant 
professor of law at the University of California at Hastings Law 
School. So I have had occasion over the past five or six years 
to become somewhat concerned with the problems of substantive 
government liability, although I can't profess to be an authority 
on the insurance aspect. I was moved this morning to think that 
I should make a couple of comments, hopefully for the benefit of 
this Committee, on the subject of where liability exists today 
and where it comes from. First of all, we always seem to start 
historically with the assumption that government liability didn't 
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exist in common law, while the fact as former Chief Justice 
Traynor so excellently pointed out in the Muskopf decis 
while the King himself may have been immune from liability under 
English jurisprudence, everyone of his employees or servants was 
indeed held liable for his acts, especially insofar as they 
damaged the subject's person and that the concept of sovereign 
immunity is one that was properly created by inadvertence rather 
than by careful study of English common law. Indeed Blackstone, 
and I happen to be possessed of a volume of the original Black-
stone edition as it was printed in the United States in 1772 and 
so I went yesterday to review it, and Blackstone tells us exactly 
in 1772 how to prosecute claims against the Crown for recovery in 
tort and recovery in actions for damage to property. It was only 
because of a lack of a fund, indeed a primeval insurance problem, 
that the concept of municipal immunity came up in the first place, 
and that was because of a township in England being unincorporated 
had nobody to pay the judgment and they anticipated in about 1680 
the problems of our boards of supervisors in the early 20th century 
and that is, without a fund, if you sue the individual members of 
the government or the township, that's not really fair, they do 
the best they can and who is to protect them? When the question 
was first raised in the United States in a case cited in footnotes 
in Muskopf, indeed it was against a Massachusetts town that did 
have a fund and it was incorporated, but they made the mistake of 
reverting to the English decision and picked up the wrong rationale 
and thus sovereign immunity was born and it was off and running. 
I might point out if the Committee will spare me another half 
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minute historically that in the constitutional convention in the 
debates on this subject, sovereign immunity was omitted from the 
u.s. Constitution because it was believed by the people at that 
time that lacking a sovereign it wouldn't be very appropriate for 
us to write some concept of sovereign immunity into our Constitution. 
It wasn't until around 1840 that the U.S. Supreme Court began to 
talk in language that said you can't sue the government and it was 
a case, incidentally, that was not in tort but in an effort to 
collect some interest in fees in a contract dispute where the 
Supreme Court said that no action could lie against the United 
States. So, there again, we were off and running. But the 
doctrine got built into state law and little by little courts 
without citing precendent began to say there is immunity unless 
it's been waived by the sovereign such that when that famous plane 
crashed into the Empire State Building in 1945, it developed that 
literally hundreds of people injured at that time tried to go to 
court and found that they were completely locked out of the 
federal courts and there was no action against the air corps for 
flying the plane into the Empire State Building and we got the 
federal Tort Claims Act. From a comparative standpoint, if I 
may before I try to make some suggestions that myself as a 
student of this problem and the Trial Lawyers Association that 
hopefully looking to the rights of our clients and not just to 
our own concerns, some suggestions that we'd like to make, it 
might be worthwhile to do a bit of comparison. There are those 
who ask for increased immunity and for California to go back now 
to increased immunity legislatively in this area would put us in 
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the category in league with but one other state in the United 
States and that's Arkansas which the only state to my 
knowledge that after the courts abolished a sovereign or municipal 
immunity reinstated it statutorily and to this day have those 
particular immunities still on their statute books. Indeed, since 
Michigan and California judicially abolished sovereign immunity 
in 1961, 24 other states have since followed suit. Seven addi-
tional states have statutorily abolished the concept of sovereign 
immunity and speak now in terms of liability and my understanding 
is that Utah, where Professor Van Alstyne is now the Vice Presi-
dent of the University, is one of those states. Three additional 
states modified the concept of sovereign immunity liberalizing 
it -- Connecticut, South Carolina and Texas. And indeed at the 
bottom of the list there is but a tiny number of states that still 
adhere to common law immunity doctrine. Six states -- Arkansas 
being the only one that's gone back to the idea that immunity 
ought to be the rule is an unanswered area rather than liability. 
Insofar as some of the problems that were presented to the 
Committee this morning, it distressed me a bit to hear it stated 
that there is liability in California, in answer to Mr. McVittie's 
question that there is liability in California for the design of a 
freeway curve which is designed inadvertently or negligently such 
that it throws cars off the road at speeds within the speed limit. 
Indeed, the Baldwin case makes it quite plain that that immunity 
exists in California and the immunity is only lost when after 
what Mr. Moore I'm sure would call a string of accidents and I 
attempted to inquire of the Committee how long such a string 
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would have to be to give rise to liability. The Baldwin case 
simply says that when history and circumstance make it quite 
plain that the condition requires some reexamination, then the 
design immunity which exists in the Government Code right now 
may be abrogated and i~s for a court to determine preliminarily 
and then for a jury to decide. It's decided much like the 
admission of confessions where the court must first make the 
preliminary determination and then the jury would be the 
secondary determiner of the fact. In other areas such as fire-
fighting that Mr. Moore referred to where he said that there 
might be an inspection and it wouldn't turn up enough and there 
would be a liability found, 850, 850.2 and 850.4 of the Govern-
ment Code make it quite clear that there is no liability in 
California for failure to provide fire protection or for the 
absence of sufficient personnel to fight the fire or for injuries 
caused to people while fighting fires on behalf of the public 
entity. I think that one thing of course that this Committee 
must carefully do before it contemplates any major change in the 
concept of immunities to hopefully increase the profits of the 
insurance industry so they will find this area more appetizing 
is to look, as Professor Van Alstyne urges, at the statutes and 
recognize that they do provide far broader immunity than I, as a 
plaintiff attorney, would even like to see the state or the cities, 
major cities especially in our state have. I don't think the 
problem that gives rise to exposure of the public entities to 
these financial problems arises because of any shortcoming or 
weakness in our immunity statute. It's broader and stronger in 
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terms of protecting the state than is common law tort doctrine. 
What we have to ask ourselves today, I think, and from here on 
forward is if there's any reason why a citizen ought to have less 
rights if he's run over by a San Francisco municipal bus than if 
he's run over by a Greyhound bus. One would presume theoretically 
that there should be no distinction and if the children in our 
schools should be hurt because of some neglect in the care and the 
supervision that's given to them, why should there be a distinction 
in the rights of the child between the public school system and the 
private school system, if there are alternative ways available to 
fund the protection of the public. There has been a myth circu-
lating for some time and I hear it being said without being said 
here and that is the myth of the crippling judgment that somehow 
government will grind to a halt because of the vast amount of 
liability that's imposed against the operation of government. 
Such has not been the case in any jurisdiction. Aside from the 
fact that there are no known instances of municipal insolvency in 
the United States or bankruptcy proceedings in the federal courts 
brought because of the inability to satisfy any such judgment, 
there really isn't any major group of people coming in and saying 
anything more than our rates are going up or we've had to change 
our approach because now we're taxing ourselves heavily to pay 
for the system. This so-called crisis has not yet reached the 
kind of proportions that people seem to be wanting to say it is. 
Everybody's insurance premiums are up as this Committee is well 
aware and it's impossible to say that the area of government 
liability represents some single area of insurance crisis that 
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requires more tightening up or more solution than even what are 
becoming lesser known or better known areas of liability such as 
say medical malpractice which got so much attention two years 
ago. The figures from a practical standpoint aren't particularly 
alarming. There aren't all that many government liability law-
suits when you look at them in the perspective of all the other 
property damage or personal injury litigation in California. This 
is a very minute amount of money in comparison to the total 
program, so it becomes difficult then to say to ourselves that we 
ought to change our standards and somehow shift the law so that 
the official tort gives less compensation than the product of 
tort. The question of how to handle the problem that Professor 
Van Alstyne is concerned about, the distinctions between discre-
tionary activities and proprietary activities, is one that I think 
has really long since been resolved fairly comfortably and 
California law really hasn't run into problems in that area, but 
probably the best example of the distinction is a federal case 
under the Federal Tort Claims Act, the Indian Towing v. The United 
States case. There the Supreme Court basically said you don't 
have to build a lighthouse, but if you build a lighthouse, you've 
got to run a safe lighthouse and that distinction can be trans-
lated into virtually every government activity so that there is 
very little risk that we're going to run into problems with people 
trying to impose their will on government doing the job of govern-
ing through the form of the personal injury lawsuit. The decision-
making process always has been exempt. It's exempt everywhere. 
It will stay exempt in California and nobody has had to pay out 
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any large amounts of money because of some decision or governmental 
choice to act or not act given the financial necessity. The 
problems where I think indeed some cost-savings can be effective 
do not incidentally lie in the area of saying don't make govern-
ment liable for the things that only government does, such as 
police or fire. The United States Supreme Court again addressed 
that question in a Federal tort claims case, the Rayaner case, 
and said that the test obviously ought not to be that. Government 
may do a lot of those functions that private industry doesn't do 
or doesn't do as often, but the test should be when the govern-
ment interacts with the public whether it performs those tasks 
carefully and properly or not because again the government can 
refrain from doing them if it's discretionary, but once they 
become involved with the public, they have to do their regular 
job carefully. I want to echo in terms of a more affirmative 
solution, one of the proposals that Professor Van Alstyne has made 
and which I'm glad to see many more people make1 and that is the 
abolition of the notice of claim provisions of the California 
Government Code. In a sense, if the name of the game is to make 
it hard to get into court, then this statute indeed does that and 
having taught five or six years of students at Hastings now and 
trying to alert them to the problems of the government notice of 
claims statutes, I find that they are among the only people 
emerging from our law schools who are aware of this tortuous path 
to the courthouse. I would suggest if hardship was what we 
wanted, that we just assign all venue over all tort claims to 
Mono County because you can't get in in the winter and then the 
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race would go to those with the most energy and the best snow-
shoes. This obviously doesn't accomplish that much of a socially 
utilitarian or desirable goal. The people who ask us to retain 
the notice of claim provisions I have to somewhat doubt their 
motives. They talk about the need to get there faster as a 
defendant and the importance of garnering the evidence quickly as 
if somehow a one year statute of limitations governing tort actions 
in California was so long that all the evidence in the world would 
disappear before you had a chance to know of the suit. If that be 
the case, why is it. that the only other states in the United States 
with a one year statute besides California are Alabama, Kentucky, 
Louisiana and Tennessee? Every other state in the U.S. has at 
least a two year and some up to six years statutes of limitations 
in personal injury and wrongful death cases. So the idea that you 
have to know within a 100 days if a claim is going to be brought 
or else all the evidence will disappear, I really don't think 
holds water when you adopt the national perspective. By elimina-
ting the notice of claim requirement, you do eliminate one layer 
of administration in between the plaintiff and the bringing of 
the suit and therefore the defense of the suit. I'm sure that the 
cost-savings aren't going to be registered in the millions of 
dollars, but they are going to be registered and it will eliminate 
a level of bureaucracy and it will eliminate needless paper work 
plus a great many court appearances; the best example being the 
routine that my office goes through probably ten times a year 
where we file on behalf of a minor whose parents have brought into 
our office more than 100 days after the event occurred_ The statute 
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plainly says that the court shall, not may, but shall grant 
judicial relief to that minor if he files with the perm s 
leave within one year but more than 100 days after the tort. 
the public entities absolutely arbitrarily and routinely re 
to waive and allow us to proceed to file the suit or at least 
have the claim heard with the result being that the city 
or the insurance company has to make at least one if not more 
court appearances on the defense for which, unlike us, they 
paid for each court appearance and then that bill is passed on to 
the taxpayer unnecessarily. There are a couple of small areas 
that I also, since I have this opportunity to make small as we 1 
as large suggestions to clean up the problems with the Code, I 
think that this Committee might look at in the area of government 
liability and that is the confusion that arises in lawsuits ar 
from injuries caused by patients in mental facilities or prisoners 
as well as injuries caused to them. Sections 844.6 and .8 of 
the Government Code provide that the public entities are not 1 
for injuries caused by or to patients in mental institut 
or to prisoners. The problem is that the public employee can be 
held liable if it's his negligence that produces either 
of injury. Where this puts me as a plaintiff's attorney 
the position when somebody comes to my office and compla 
injury that occurred either while he was in such a place or 
of 
cause of someone who escaped or someone who was visiting and an 
outsider was injured is that I'm free to go ahead and represent 
this person or their heirs in the event of death cases in mental 
hospitals, but I can't sue the public entity. We have one 
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where we had a wrongful death claim where we ended up with some-
thing like 40 defendants simply because through discovery we 
found the name of every nurse and every doctor and every orderly 
who had worked in the particular hospital and attended or not 
attended the particular patient when they were supposed to and 
we were required to join everyone of them as defendants in the 
lawsuit lest we be missing a necessary defendant. The increased 
costs to the state to the Attorney General's office defending 
that action obviously could have been eliminated to the simple 
processes of allowing the suit to be brought directly against 
the entity. I think I have to speculate because legislative 
history is a bit vague in this narrow area, I have to assume that 
the legislative thinking in immunizing the entity but allowing the 
suits against the individual would fall into one of two areas. 
Either that the state might occasionally exercise its right to 
refuse the defense in certain limited cases but as a political 
matter, the state doesn't do that because they would have to 
contend with all the public employees who wanted to know why 
they weren't getting defenses in lawsuits or they felt that perhaps 
juries would be more sympathetic if they didn't know that the 
reason that the Attorney General was there or the city attorney's 
office was there was because it was a public liability case. I 
think juries are a little more sophisticated than that nowadays 
and so whatever reason may have existed for that narrow little 
exemption has disappeared and uniformity would be more valuable 
and would probably again result in some modest savings of 
administrative costs over the years. On a larger plane, or 
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hopefully a larger plane, I've heard much talk this morning about 
the problems of the small county and the problems of the small 
town and the problems of the state and of Los Angeles, the major 
counties. As a practical matter,once again while everybody 
complains about increased taxes and the expenses of governing or 
doing any kind of business activity, obviously neither the state 
nor the City of Los Angeles nor for that matter the County of 
San Francisco as I understand it or most of the major urban areas 
are running out of money to defend and pay the volume of tort 
claims that they have to contend with either by being partially 
insured or wholly self-insured. They don't like the increased 
costs obviously, but they have been able to live with it and 
still function. That's not the biggest problem by any means. 
What is often overlooked, and in a sense I do now particularly 
miss the absence of Assemblyman Knox because I know of his 
particular interest in this area, is that in California there 
are over 4,500 special government districts. It's an incredible 
number of districts, in addition to 1,144 school districts. Now 
when you add that to the 58 counties and to the hundreds and 
hundreds of cities and towns that have to be insured, you're 
talking about 6 or 7,000 insurable entities and that, as every-
body agrees, is where you are going to find a morass of courts. 
It's going to be incredibly expensive for the Lake Tahoe 
Cemetery District, to which I am privileged to pay about a tenth 
of a cent on my tax dollar each year, when they have to go out 
and buy liability insurance because they have a truck and the 
truck's got to go out and do part of its work for the District 
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on the highway. Now the thought that you have such a multitude 
of districts which right now have no uniform basis -- there is no 
pool, there is no reciprocal to which they can look -- obviously 
means that the tax dollar is being cut up in 6,000 little 
different bites. Because of my very profound feeling that the 
problem in compensating tort victims is not whether they ought 
to get paid but where to find the money for them and can we 
afford them and that being the philosophical debate, the first 
question I would want to ask is, isn't there some way we can 
reduce the number of insurance policies that have to be bought or 
the number of potential defendants who can be involved in this 
litigation by simply providing such a pool as the Illinois pool 
system that they are devising for their townships or encouraging 
the formation of reciprocals much like the doctor-owned recipro-
cals that sprang up after the malpractice problems were attacked 
by the Keene Act. It seems to me that with the 6,000 public 
entities, many of whom I've become involved in such as community 
hospitals or water districts as defendants in lawsuits that we 
handle, bridge districts or transit districts, that some form of 
consolidation and some further inquiry into this area of simpli-
fying their problems would be a very significant step that could 
be taken before we get to the point of saying you lose your 
rights because you got on the public transit. I'd be happy to 
answer any questions that the Committee may have and it's been a 
pleasure being here. 
CHAIRMAN BEVERLY: Would you comment on the bifurcation 
issue of damages and liability? 
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MR. WERCHICK: It's generally impractical and in many 
cases you end up trying the same case twice. Bifurcation -- I 
don't ever like it because it is very difficult for a trial 
attorney to get into the right frame of mind to try a bifurcated 
case or try the same case twice. It seems to work, if I must 
concede that it works at all, only in the areas where you have a 
question like course and scope of employment or a special employ-
ment situation or declaratory relief for insurance coverage 
defenses, where those issues really won't go to the same jury. 
To try a case one-half first and then another half, you always 
have the question. Do you go with the same jury or not? If not, 
you've got two courts and two juries tied up in a waste of court 
time and they are not defense verdicts that come down and in our 
cases and in other cases that suggest that juries just don't 
always vote for a plaintiff just because he got hurt. They do 
decide defenses when they are appropriate. I don't think there's 
a need to routinely bifurcate cases at all. It would really cost 
a lot more money and a lot more of everybody's time, as well as 
break my heart. 
CHAIRMAN BEVERLY: Any questions? Justice Thompson . 
JUSTICE THOMPSON: I'm curious on two items. We're 
told by the governmental entities that if we mess with the claims 
statute, we're going to increase their liability. Do you know of 
any studies that have been done as to how many claims are actually 
missed so that governments are immunized. I have the impression 
that the amount of education from CTLA that not many are so then 
we wouldn't be changing the liability very much if we did 
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eliminate the claims statute. I don't know. 
MR. WERCHICK: I don't think any -- I think that an 
awful lot of the missed claims statutes are hopefully forgotten 
by the attorneys who may have forgotten them, I'm afraid to say, 
and we're trying to put a stop to that, or people find their 
rights are barred and just stop right there. I don't know that 
any numbers can even possibly be kept. 
JUSTICE THOMPSON: On a different subject. I think a 
lot of people, at least I for one, am concerned somewhat about 
friction or transactional costs in the system. These are items 
that are necessarily expended the way we now operate,but do not 
go to compensate victims. Part of that I suspect in the 
governmental area comes out a joinder where the good judgment on 
the part of a lawyer or if not his own malpractice exposure 
requires that he join a governmental entity in some instances 
where liability may be questionable. Can you see any possibility 
of determining early on in the game those cases where the full 
defense costs should not be expended by one particular defendant 
of a large number who may be named in a lawsuit? 
MR. WERCHICK: This is a terrible problem and I think 
this is an area where the plaintiff's bar is badly maligned. We 
really don't join multiple defendants for the pleasure of it. We 
join them because bitter experience has taught us the times we 
went to court and a good defense lawyer got up and said they 
didn't sue the guy who's really responsible and we only get one 
shot. If there were some way that the law could provide a 
defense to that problem, then I think every plaintiff would say 
-90-
• 
• 
I 
he'd rather try his case one on one. Just one defense lawyer 
sitting there and one set of witnesses and not have six guys 
sitting there wasting their company's money and the taxpayer's 
money. But nobody to my knowledge has yet come up with a pro-
posal that would insulate us against the deficiency of lacking 
the necessary defendant. I'm fully aware of how much more 
depositions and records copying costs which are part of your 
fractional cost factors in each one of these cases, when you have 
to make six copies instead of one and paper proliferates like mad, 
but we have no protection for our client either in the government 
liability area or in the private sector. I just am not aware of 
any way. I'd love to know it the day I file suit. 
JUSTICE THOMPSON: Is the principal risk there, Mr. 
Werchick, that the defense tactically will say whoever is not 
named and had any connection with the occurrence is the dirty 
so-and-so that caused it all. 
MR. WERCHICK: Your Honor is well aware, I know, of the 
problems today that are being created as we await resolution of 
the question of bringing in other parties and it's already 
occurring that many trial judges anticipating that a ruling could 
go either way are asking juries to apportion liability among 
defendants, even though the law doesn't provide for that now. 
Some judges are going so far as asking the juries to apportion 
the liability among present parties and absent parties in the 
possibility that our Supreme Court may decide that that is an 
appropriate way to go. That being the case, you see the dilemma 
that I would face should any of those people that the court 
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ruled that way and any of those people be absent. How do I 
protect my cl against the charge that somebody far down 
road actually culpable it doesn't even have to be 10~~ 
-- but 4~~ culpable in a million dollar or half-a-million dollar 
lawsuit is an awful lot of my client's income and medical expenses 
and so forth. I wish there were some way we could require con-
solidation as it were of the defense and when defendants don't 
have a conflict of interest just as plaintiffs in plane crash 
cases are often required by the federal courts to consolidate 
their action and bring it in a single district and litigate as 
many questions as possible, I would love to see it if there was a 
way that we could forcemultip1e defendants to state for the court 
whether they had a conflict or not and if they couldn't establish 
to the court's satisfaction that they had a conflict, they were to 
designate one of their number and he was to defend all of the 
defendants for trial purposes and if there was an apportion to be 
made, it would be as with him as defense lawyer. I don't know if 
that would work or not, but it might. 
CHAIRMAN BEVERLY: Any further questions? Mr. McVittie. 
ASSEMBLYMAN McVITTIE: In respect to the issue of the 
question of bifurcation of issues, as a trial lawyer I can see 
why I would rather have the jury there continually to decide 
liability and damages because the circumstances regarding the 
tort would be considered by them indirectly in setting damages. 
But in terms of society's purpose here of cutting down the amount 
of time it takes to try a case, you're indicating that if we go 
ahead and allow bifurcation so that juries can decide the question 
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of liability, we would have to bring them back or have a separate 
jury decide damages later on and that would take additional time. 
Is that the Trial Lawyers' position? 
MR. WERCHICK: Or in a lot of cases it would mean 
calling the same witnesses back twice. 
ASSEMBLYMAN McVITTIE: So in terms of time, then, the 
time involved is impaneling a new jury. 
MR. WERCHICK: The time involved in impaneling a new 
jury and familiarizing them with enough of the circumstances 
whether it be the entire circumstance of the accidental event, 
or part of those circumstances so that they can judge the case 
ASSEMBLYMAN MCVITTIE: But for the economic loss in 
terms of the medical bills, there's no problem there. Probably 
both sides stipulate to the bills in many cases. Lost wages you 
might have to bring in their employer, perspective earnings an 
economist, but those are generally apart from liability issues 
are they not? 
MR. WERCHICK: What you're saying, Mr. McVittie, and 
observing correctly, is that I'd say most commonly the damage 
portion of the trial is much briefer than the liability portion 
of the trial which is another reason that I don't really see the 
need for bifurcation because probably in 80% of the cases, 3/4 
or more of your time is spent on liability than on damages. And 
if you're going to just say in every case or virtually every case 
we're going to go through the machinery of re-impaneling the jury, 
having opening statements and closing arguments and whatever 
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background we have to give that jury on the accidents so they can 
judge it credibly a one-day trial on damages, you've made a 
four-day trial out of the one-day trial and damages in virtually 
every case. 
ASSEMBLYMAN MCVITTIE: But then you're saying that the 
Trial Lawyers position is merely one of economics protecting the 
public well-being in terms of reducing costs of litigation and 
that's why they oppose severance of the issues. 
MR. WERCHICK: Are you asking me if I'm afraid that 
bifurcation will cut the sizes of our verdicts way down or some-
thing of that sort, cause I'll meet that head on. I don't think 
it would. I still have enough faith in the jury system. I don't 
think we'd lose the money. 
ASSEMBLYMAN McVITTIE: I think we'd have fewer run-away 
verdicts than we do. 
MR. WERCHICK: I don't think there are that many verdicts 
where the trial of liab ity results in a higher verdict and I'll 
tell you why. A lot of the cases where the trial of liability 
results in a fairly close question, those three jurors who voted 
against your liability verdict and have been told by the honorable 
trial judge that they must deliberate and vote on all the other 
issues, boy do they get after you on proximate cause and damages 
when they get into the jury room. It frequently results in a 
compromise verdict on damages in a lower amount because they just 
weren't that sold that it was 75% comparative negligence. They 
thought it was 30% for the plaintiff or something like that and 
so they get in there and when it comes to the amount of dollars, 
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they have their way to an extent. 
ASSEMBLYMAN MCVITTIE: Now getting back to the argument 
that CTLA proposes, and that is that to try and question punitive 
damages or the damages separately generates more court time. In 
terms of that issue, if indeed we assume that fifty percent of 
the cases are won or lost by the plaintiff, then half the cases 
that are tried we wouldn't have to go any further, so we save 
time. Doesn't that compensate for the additional time it would 
take later on the prevailing cases, the cases that go beyond 
liability to recall the jury? What I am saying is isn't there 
a wash on both sides? 
MR. WERCHICK: No, because of half of the cases that 
we lose,we'd still spend 3/4 or 7/8 of that time litigating the 
liability. So you'd only save the very tip of that iceberg 
instead of the whole big chunk of it by bifurcating, and I'm 
saying that if you did it in 80% of the cases where either we 
won them or you're just talking about a day or two or less on 
damages,you haven•t saved anything. 
ASSEMBLYMAN McVITTIE: I think we're missing a point 
though, and that is this. In the cases where you're going to 
litigate them all the way through, right now you're doing that 
anyway, so we're talking about the additional time to impanel a 
new jury for the sole question of damages. And if you assume, 
I think it's probably in the ball park of 50% win/loss ratio, 
that saved time unless 25% of those cases are saved, that time 
would certainly, it would seem, cover the initial time to impanel 
a jury on a case that would go all the way. Well, it's a real 
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wash, so really it wouldn't cost us hardly anymore in terms of 
court administration. 
MR. WERCHICK: I think the problem we're running into, 
the ion numbers in front of me, I 
have them in my office. I think the problem is that you are 
assuming that the average trial is, say a 10 day court trial, 
10 court days, so you might save three or four days if you had 
bifurcated all damages in those cases that were a defense ver-
dict. I think more to the truth of the matter is that the 
average trial is four or five days of which the first day, at 
least, is spent in selecting a jury and opening remarks, the 
last day in deliberations and part of the day before in argu-
ments of counsel; so we're talking about maybe three days of 
evidence. Now if you take in those three days of evidence and 
you save one day, or 20% of your time in 5~/o of your cases, you 
see, you've only saved 10% of the court time. But what you've 
said is in all 10~/o of the cases we're going to pick two juries, 
we're going to have two opening statements, two closing argu-
ments and two periods of deliberation by the jury. I think 
you'll find that you've used four or five times as much of the 
court time and the lawyer time and the witness time and so forth 
to do it that way, than by just going all the way through the 
average trial. 
JUSTICE THOMPSON: Is there any reason you have to need 
two juries? In the death penalty case we used one. 
MR. WERCHICK: The argument about bifurcating and 
going on with the same jury leads to lots of problems in judicial 
administration for one thing, because the courts can't set aside 
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enough time. They can't predict the amount of time for a given 
trial because every case has that alternative to it. And so 
plain old planning becomes a Tell how 
long a tr 1 to run becomes a problem and then don't 
you, in a sense, defeat the purpose by stopping the jury in the 
middle of the case and saying, alright, go out and decide the 
liability. We're only going to go forward. If you're convinced 
so far, you certainly haven't accomplished what I think Mr. 
McVittie wants to accomplish, which is a regularized and routin-
ized saving of time. And you've just injected some period of 
jury deliberation in the middle instead of at the end. I don't 
think it's going to cost either side of the bar much money to do 
that,but I think it just unduly complicates things. I will con-
fess, Justice Thompson, I have no personal experience with a case 
bifurcated in the middle. I've tried cases that were bifurcated 
on a special defense and prevailed against the special defense in 
all cases because frankly when you get up and tell the jury that 
all you want is a chance to try your case, most juries say, that's 
fine. They don't like special defenses. So I find that, in fact, 
bifurcation does seem to be a rather needless expenditure of 
court time when it comes to special defenses. I have no personal 
experience, though, with splitting it in the middle. I don't 
see that it would accomplish that much. 
CHAIRMAN BEVERLY: Anything further? Thank you, 
Counsel. Robert Carlson from the Department of Transportation. 
ROBERT CARLSON: Mr. Chairman, my name is Bob Carlson, 
Attorney for the Department of Transportation. I have been a 
member of Justice Thompson's Advisory Committee. We have sent 
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to that Committee our formal views of how we feel about the govern-
ment tort liab ity law. 
I would like to start off first with bifurcation. We 
found bifurcation succeeds. Also, when a verdict comes back 
against us on liability, it makes for a better chance to settle a 
case. Also, some judges are not willing to grant us a motion for 
summary judgment, and then we have to have the problem solved by 
a jury. And we believe that the system works, cuts down on court 
time and also we use the same judge. We also use the same jury, 
and that has worked. 
I hope the Committee has, or Committee Counsel has had 
a chance to look at this report prepared about 16 years ago on 
government tort liability, prepared by the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee when they were considering the Government Tort Liability 
Act as to what was the exposure of local government and the 
state government when the bills were going through the Legislature. 
Statistics are in here from local government and from state govern-
ment as to what their exposure was at that time and what the pre-
diction was for liability of government based upon the Act recom-
mended to it by the Law Revision Commission. I have provided the 
Committee Counsel with the statistics that carry on from the time 
the 1963 Act was enacted and what's happened to the Department of 
Transportation with regard to the number of claims, number of law-
suits and also on the charts I've indicated the point in time 
when we have the Baldwin case decisions to refer to. And also 
the point in time when the Lee case was decided by our Supreme 
Court. I hope that these figures will be helpful to the Com-
mittee. 
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The one thing that I'd like to point out to the Com-
mittee and it is the problem we have with design immunity. The 
design immunity was recommended to the Legislature by the Law 
Revision Commission and was passed intact by the Legislature. 
This design immunity is based on the principle that a public pro-
ject or a highway project that was reasonable as built, that was 
the basis of liability at the time it was designed, not by sub-
sequent passage of time or the increase of the amount of people 
that use the highway or that use the public projects or develop-
ments on either side of the highwayo 
Two Supreme Court decisions, California Supreme Court, 
in the Becker case and the Johnson case upheld this design immunity 
that the jury and courts were not going to second guess government 
on the basis of design that later became unreasonable because of 
the fact of passage of time or the increased amount of motor ve-
hicles on a particular highway. And then along came the Baldwin 
case. The Baldwin case is a simple rear-ender case on a four 
lane highway. The Baldwin case engrafted upon our tort liability 
law a provision, an exception without even in the law of changed 
circumstances, changed conditions. Meaning that if there is 
development on either side of the highway, increase in traffic, 
or some other cause, the immunity did not apply. This was never 
intended by the Legislature; never intended by the Law Revision 
Commission when they enacted that section. And this day there 
isn't a case that's based on design immunity where the plaintiff 
cannot allege some changed condition in the highway or in the 
public project at the time it was built. My suggestion to the 
Committee is that they restate the law on design immunity and 
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that they eliminate the judicially engrafted exception of changed 
conditions. 
On 
catastrophic cases 
of j we've started a project in 
into trust for life care con-
tracts. This way, we've found that we can agree upon a set figure 
to be paid into trust to take care of this catastrophically 
injured plaintiff in the future. There may be disagreements on 
life expectancy because usually the plaintiff's attorney says 
that he will live out his normal years. And of course our doctors 
say that he will not live out his normal years. But we do pay 
this money into trust and then when that person dies, the plain-
tiff dies, then that trust is terminated and the principal and 
the remaining interest is returned to the government. I think 
this is one thing that should be considered by the Committee. 
We do agree with the statement of Mr. Van Alstyne on limitation 
of damages. We think that is a viable consideration for this 
Committee to consider. We have filed our formal statement with 
the Advisory Committee and I would be happy to answer any 
questions. 
CHAIRMAN BEVERLY: Mr. McVittie. 
ASSEMBLYMAN McVITTIE: Mr. Carlson, if circumstances 
have changed regarding highway design and you are aware of cer-
tain roads out there where there would be a dangerous condition, 
if certain climactic circumstances occurred and the public was 
not adequately appr and a citizen did incur damages, why 
shouldn•t that citizen be allowed to recover for his damages? 
MR. CARLSON: Under your facts, Mr. McVittie, there 
would be a situation liability could be alleged and proved 
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that there was a dangerous condition and a failure to warrant. 
In this particular case involved we have a simple act of a rear-
ending accident; a negligent third party. Now we have double-
striped highways today where people can legally make a left-hand 
turn across that double yellow line into a private driveway. 
They stop in the fast lane of traffic and are rear-ended. Should 
government be liable for that? The Supreme Court said in the 
Baldwin case that they should put in a left-hand turn lane, a 
left-hand turn pocket. We put those left-hand turn lanes in, 
those pockets in. We have, under certain circumstances in traf-
fic conditions, there's cars that fill up that left-hand turn 
lane back out into the fast lane and are still rear-ended. 
ASSEMBLYMAN McVITTIE: Mr. Carlson, didn't a jury have 
to make a finding of fact that the state was negligent before 
there could be any recovery in that case? I am not familiar with 
the case, but it seems to me the jury, as a trier of fact, would 
have found that Cal-Trans was negligent. 
MR. CARLSON: The Baldwin case was decided on a summary 
judgment. The Superior Court ruled with Cal-Trans, the District 
Court ruled with Cal-Trans, and the Supreme Court reversed. 
ASSEMBLYMAN McVITTIE: Well, reversed and set for new 
trial? 
MR. CARLSON: Yes, they set for trial and they said 
that the motion for summary judgment should not have been 
granted. 
ASSEMBLYMAN McVITTIE: Okay, so the question had to be 
adjudicated eventually. There has to be a finding of fact that 
negligence is involved. 
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MR. CARLSON: Yes, there was, and you are unable to use 
the design immunity because of the law of the case because there 
were changed conditions •.• 
ASSEMBLYMAN McVITTIE: But the point is that you're 
arguing that there should be immunity, but the point is that in 
that case there was a finding of negligence, and my question goes 
back once again -- forget this thing of immunity. I can see 
where Cal-Trans, with a budget, will take the money and build 
new freeways, that's very natural. But in terms of a person's 
right to recover, why shouldn't they recover their damages if 
there's actually negligence involved? 
MR. CARLSON: I would say that if there's negligence, 
there's a dangerous condition, I would agree with Mr. McVittie. 
There should be a cause of action and there should be an avenue 
for recovering the damages. 
ASSEMBLYMAN McVITTIE: Alright, so you're saying that 
you really don't support the immunity doctrine because immunity 
gives you the complete protection regardless of negligence. 
MR. CARLSON: I'm just saying that the Legislature 
should revitalize the design immunity as it was originally in-
tended when the Tort Claims Act was passed. 
ASSEMBLYMAN McVITTIE: The Judiciary Committee is going 
to consider the entire scope of immunity statutes in the next 
couple of weeks and I hope you come there. The other question, 
in terms of limitation of damages, why should your department 
be treated differently than, let's say, manufacturers that pro-
duce products which are used by the public, where there's no 
limitation of damages? 
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MR. CARLSON: I think the previous witness mentioned 
this, I think Mr. Moore, that a pr driveway to a plant can 
be closed down, our objective, in we have a duty to 
to keep the traffic moving even most 
circumstances of accidents on highway and freeway, and even 
under the most adverse weather conditions. 
ASSEMBLYMAN McVITTIE: Let's take the circumstance 
where one of your employees is driving one of your Cal-Trans 
trucks and he is going to water the shrubbery along the San Ber-
nardino freeway in Montclair and he doesn't park the truck off 
the road and leaves it in the inner lane and a person comes along 
and it's foggy there and he just goes right into it. Assuming 
there's a finding of negligence, and the person, say, loses both 
legs, why shouldn•t they recover for the non-economic loss con-
nected with it where they can't enjoy sports. 
MR. CARLSON: Mr. McVittie, they should collect there 
that was a negligent parking of vehicle, which is a negligent 
operation of the vehicle, and there is liability for that 
government and there should be recovery. 
ASSEMBLYMAN McVITTIE: Alright, so you're saying that 
government management should not be treated different in 
private sector. 
MR. CARLSON: No question about it. In fact, the 
Tort Claims Act puts government vehicles in the same shoes and 
are treated the same as operators of private vehicles. 
ASSEMBLYMAN McVITTIE: And those standards of negl 
gence would apply to other tort actions as well, outside vehicu-
liability? 
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MR. CARLSON: That's the policy issue before the court. 
ASSEMBLYMAN McVITTIE: Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN BEVERLY: I though that you were in agreement 
with Mr. Van Alstyne on the limitation of damages. 
MR. CARLSON: Well, I am to this extent, that if the 
Committee wants to consider the viable method of limiting lia-
bility of government to cut down the cost or find a definite 
insurable risk, that would be one way to do it. 
CHAIRMAN BEVERLY: Incidentally, I am curious. What 
happened in that Baldwin case ultimately? 
MR. CARLSON: A jury verdict. I believe that it was 
$200,000. 
CHAIRMAN BEVERLY: Thank you. Senator Russell. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Are you saying that under today, in 
that Baldwin case, that the state, or I guess the counties, are 
liable for any accident that happens on the streets and freeways 
wherein somebody can say the freeway or the road, even though 
it was built 30 years ago, should have kept up to standards and 
because it did not, this caused my accident. Then if the jury 
that so finds that they are liable for anything that happens on 
that road, does that mean •.. 
MR. CARLSON: Yes, that's my understanding. If the 
highway doesn't keep up the design and technology up to the time 
of the accident, that could be a basis of liability of not only 
cities and counties, but the state. Also, here we have a prob-
lem of how do you handle the negligent acts of third parties? 
Our Supreme Court said in a case involving, I think it was injury 
and death to some people on some beach down on the University of 
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California campus at Santa Barbara, they held that the government, 
the University, was not liable for those acts of third parties. 
And here we have the same problem on our highways of 
lating the le Code, following too c or making 
turns, making government liable. An example is the divider 
barriers on our freeways. The offending vehicle is crossing into 
the other lane, yet he is violating the law when he crosses over 
that double yellow line. And yet there are some situations like 
that that have given rise to liability. 
CHAIRMAN BEVERLY: Mr. McVittie. 
ASSEMBLYMAN McVITTIE: Well, I think there's something 
that hasn't come out and I don't know much about this area, 
it would seem to me that the fact that a freeway is 30 years old 
and design standards have changed, is not going to automatically 
ipso facto impose liability on a state, Mr. Carlson. It would 
seem to me that the court would have to have a finding that 
state was aware of the design standards and that knowingly or 
carelessly failed to post warning notices, either slow or caut 
or what have you, under those circumstances. Now would those 
qualify the statement you made to the Senator? 
MR. CARLSON: Yes, there is a known condit 
provides the travelling public, there is under the Act a 
to warn. 
ASSEMBLYMAN McVITTIE: And then in connection with 
so-called vicarious liability situations, the state would 
be responsible if it contributed to the ultimate injury where a 
person using that highway didn't see a sign and created another 
injury. For example, in the San Bernardino case tried by the 
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former president of the California Trial Lawyers, where it 
successfully pointed out in San Bernardino County that the stop 
sign didn't have the reflector glass in it, and the County hadn't 
replaced it, the person came through and blew the stop sign 
hitting another car creating just bizarre and fantastic injuries. 
The County was brought in for negligence in failing to maintain 
the stop sign. That's the type of vicarious liability you're 
referring to. In other words, there is some evidence on the 
part of the state •.• 
MR. CARLSON: If the sign is not properly maintained, 
of course, sure. Or if it does not meet the sign manual estab-
lished by the Department of Transportation. 
ASSEMBLYMAN Me VITTIE: Sure. 
MR. CARLSON: So there is some act of omission or com-
mission on the part of the government agency including Cal-Trans. 
My remarks are only addressed to the design immunity as such, 
and as it's articulated in our book. 
CHAIRMAN BEVERLY: Any further questions? Ms. Gorman. 
MS. GORMAN: I have a couple of questions on the Baldwin 
case. It's been some time since I read it. Do you recall how 
many accidents had occurred at that same location prior to the 
Baldwin accident? 
MR. CARLSON: I do not recall. There was a history of 
accidents there. 
MS. GORMAN: Also, I believe that it was cited that 
there were a number of requests from local governments in the 
area and from local legislators requesting that something be 
done at that location. 
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MR. CARLSON: That is correct. 
MS. GORMAN: And there was a subsequent change fol-
lowing that? 
MR. CARLSON: Yes, there was. And, of course, there 
is a provision on evidence of subsequent precautions in the law. 
MS • GORMAN: Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN BEVERLY: Bob, thank you very much. We have 
remaining Dr. Wayne Preston and James c. Sanders, who I under-
stand are appearing together. Would you come forward please? 
And then Robert Walters from the City of San Diego. That will 
conclude it. 
DR. WAYNE PRESTON: Senator, and members of the Com-
mittee, I appreciate this opportunity to present some very brief 
statements on behalf of the schools in California. I want at 
the outset to state that I am a lay person. I am not an attorney 
nor am I an expert on insurance. I am a member and Chairman of 
the State Committee of CASBO Insurance Research Committee. 
CHAIRMAN BEVERLY: Incidentally, this Committee by 
its charter is no more than half lawyers in its makeup. I don't 
know if you're aware of that. 
DR. PRESTON: Much of what has already been said today 
I would be redundant in repeating in my prepared statements and 
I will not do so at this time. I think it's in summary to say 
that schools have been experiencing the same increases in costs. 
One to 600% in premiums over a period of two years. My own 
district went from $78,000 to $352,000 in two years, going from 
$10,000 deductible to $100,000 deductible. What is more impor-
tant is that this, in our particular district as an example, 
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represents one-third of our increase in income in the one year. 
This is money that we just cannot spend for student education. 
It would be interesting to note that -- and we do not have exact 
figures, as Mr, Moore pointed out. The industry doesn't seem to 
keep all the figures we would like to have, but we are at the 
present time attempting to find out. Working with the State 
Department of Education, our committee has developed a question-
naire which we hope to get the statistics for all schools in 
California. At this time we estimate there's between $2 and $3 
billion worth of liability coverage for California schools with 
premiums well in excess of $100 million. Now, again, those are 
very broad figures because we don't have them exact. It's a big 
problem for California schools. One of the most critical aspects 
is the fact that insurance is starting to dictate what the cur-
riculum will be. I don't want to take issue with the previous 
testimony as to whether we should teach hang gliding or scuba 
diving in schools, but we're now getting to the point where we 
are starting to be told you can't teach driver training; you 
can't have football games; and we don't know when it's going to 
get to the point where you can't have chemistry experiments in 
the classroom. We are at the point where the insurance industry 
is dictating the curriculum of California schools beyond which 
the parents and the boards are not allowed to control. We feel 
that this is •.. 
CHAIRMAN BEVERLY: Senator Russell. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Are the insurance people saying you 
can't have football or we won't cover you, or is that a decision 
that the board makes under the facts that they either want 
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insurance or they don't want insurance? 
DR. PRESTON: We have districts that cannot obtain 
coverage unless they take it with exclusions and some of those 
exclusions include medical malpractice for football games. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: So then they make the decision ... 
DR. PRESTON: They make the decision to have football 
without medical malpractice insurance. 
CHAIRMAN BEVERLY: Mr. McVittie. 
ASSEMBLYMAN McVITTE: You're saying that you have to 
make sure that your physician is covered because he's the one 
that performs the professional duty and so you can accept the 
exclusionary policy, but I'm sure that you can say to any doctor 
who volunteers or is compensated to be the school team doctor 
that he has to have coverage himself. Isn't that what most are 
doing? 
DR. PRESTON: It's one thing if you have a doctor who's 
a member of your staff or if you are depending upon doctors 
serving for football games alone. The difficulty is to get a 
doctor who is willing to serve at the football game even if you 
pay him. Under the circumstances, they do not come under a 
medical malpractice policy. 
ASSEMBLYMAN McVITTIE: If you don't have a doctor 
there, where can the school be responsible for what I assume you 
are referring to as medical malpractice? 
DR. PRESTON: Well, this is one of the difficulties 
when the League rules or the CIF starts requiring that you have 
a doctor. You can't get a doctor and then the board has to make 
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the decision on what basis they are going to continue football. 
ASSEMBLYMAN McVITTIE: I understand. If you're getting 
a doctor, you just insist that the doctor present evidence of 
his insurance coverage. You get a doctor who has got coverage. 
DR. PRESTON: And then if you do not get a doctor who 
is willing to serve with that coverage •• 
ASSEMBLYMAN McVITTIE: But then you don't have the risk. 
You don't have the malpractice risk because it's his risk that 
you're suing. 
DR. PRESTON: Unless you don't --well, if the League 
or CIF rule, you can't conduct a contest without a doctor. 
ASSEMBLYMAN McVITTIE: Well, then you have to have a 
doctor. But where you have this • 
DR. PRESTON: That's the problem. But if you can't get 
a doctor who will come under those circumstances, you either don't 
have a contest or you have it without medical malpractice. 
CHAIRMAN BEVERLY: If you recall, Wadie Deddeh had a 
measure to permit the volunteer physician to be immune under 
these circumstances. 
DR. PRESTON: It's a serious problem and I'm merely 
indicating that this is the direction in which it's going. We 
have had districts, many districts, when their renewals come up 
have extreme problems in finding a company who will cover them 
for all their activities without going to them and saying to them, 
o .k., we will no longer conduct these kinds of educational 
activities. I think it would be presumptuous of me to try and 
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suggest solutions or suggest actions. The testimony today has 
been far more expert than anything I could give. I'm here 
primarily to emphasize that it is a critical problem for the 
California schools and I appreciate the opportunity to emphasize 
that at this time. 
CHAIRMAN BEVERLY: Mr. McVittie. 
ASSEMBLYMAN McVITTIE: Directing your attention to 
page 3 of your paper presented to us, you stated in question #2 
that method should be adopted to preclude unfair enrichment. 
What do you mean by unfair enrichment? 
DR. PRESTON: Excessive awards based upon relatively 
spurious or minor claims. 
ASSEMBLYMAN McVITTIE: What are those? 
DR. PRESTON: I'll have to again indicate I'm not a 
technician. This came through the work of our Committee and some 
of the testimony to our committee and I'm not prepared at this 
time to clarify that. I'm sorry, Mr. McVittie . 
ASSEMBLYMAN McVITTIE: And so we don't have any 
evidence of that at this point in time. 
DR. PRESTON: No. 
ASSEMBLYMAN McVITTIE: Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN BEVERLY: Any further questions? Do you have 
a statement, sir? 
MR. JAMES C. SANDERS: Yes, my name is James Sanders. 
I think as the program indicates, you'll see that my office and 
my organization are involved in the statewide insurance committee 
which includes some members of the cASBO organization as well as 
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insurance producers and principal insurance underwriters 
throughout the state. This committee's main purpose is to 
establish communication between the various elements of the 
insured, the broker and the underwriters, and to clear up some 
of the problems that do come up, particularly those that are 
interpretations of coverage and exposure under the statutes. I 
would like to pass over some of the things that have been well 
outlined here by Dr. Preston. I might add I am pleased to be 
here because I've been confronted with so many problems in the 
insurance industry with the lack of activity and our portfolio 
on the stock market. It's nice to be discussing what I consider 
to be one of the growth industries of California which is 
litigation. 
CHAIRMAN BEVERLY: Are you an insurance agent or with 
the school district? 
MR. SANDERS: I'm an insurance broker. We find that 
in the past number of years the inability to interest anyone in 
getting into the insurance of public agencies, particularly 
school districts, has resulted in this enormous social disloca-
tion and that we have courses that can no longer be offered. We 
have field and hiking trips that no longer can be permitted 
because the trustees are unwilling to undertake them without 
insurance, the insurers are unwilling to underwrite it. I 
don't think this happened just by accident and I'm certainly 
not one to defend our industries being without fault or without 
panic. As a matter of fact, they are known to go both ways. 
When things look good they cut each other to pieces on rates and 
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when things look bad they run out of their pasture, but it's 
our job to represent the insured and try to bring to him the 
best information possible. And I might add that our real 
function is more as a risk manager than simply buying insurance. 
I think if you understand risk management, it really means try-
ing to find any other alternative before you buy an insurance 
policy. Can you get rid of the risk? Can you pass it on to 
someone else? Can you control it? And as a last result, if you 
can't pass it on to someone else, you can't get rid of it, you 
probably have to ilEure it if you do not have the financial 
ability to absorb it. So that's why it's just a simple common 
sense method of analyzing what your risks are and how to handle 
them. This is becoming more and more of our job. We certainly 
don't offer insurance as the first solution and as the expenses 
climb out of sight, it certainly has become unavailable to some 
public agencies. We see, however, the collision course that's 
being observed today in the curricula of various schools is on 
a collision course with the underwriters. They are trying to 
restrict coverage and most of our schools are expanding their 
activities. This happens to be particularly true in the 
community colleges. We have cases there where they are spon-
soring trips to Europe and incidentally, I guess there's some 
financial incentive for this. We had a tragic accident this 
summer in one of the community colleges, but it seemed to me 
the beneficiary of the whole trip was the travel agency that 
co-sponsored it with the community college. A van went up 
carrying some students and some non-students. The driver fell 
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as and overturned on his way to the San Juans and, of course, 
school dis will be the deep pocket that they'll go after 
suit comes. The instructor gets the free trip. The 
students only 1 out $441 for eight weeks in the wonder 
San Juans and get two units of credit which gives the 
college some income from the state. So I guess every-
body comes out alright except it exposes the college to an 
enormous liability and we see more and more of these activities 
going on. We have in some community colleges activities such as 
opening up beauty parlors, beauticians competing with the local 
people, dentalx-rays provided free for the public which exposes 
us again to a malpractice situation creating thereby of course 
more jobs for the new products and law schools. So this whole 
thing continues to escalate and the best we can do is just point 
out which areas are no longer covered by the insurance policies 
and this is, of course, one of our main functions. You have 
liabilities that are sometimes not clear on one hand. They are 
outlined by statute and we have our insurance contracts on the 
hand which may or may not cover these liabilities. I 
think that when we get into various alternatives, innova 
proposals such as pooling or self-insured, certainly there are 
some cases that warrant this kind of approach. I think they 
were pretty well described by a few of the speakers before. I 
would encourage such kinds of alternatives wherever it would seem 
you could measure these things, but I want to underline what 
one of the previous speakers said also. There really is no 
actuarial soundness in ratemaking for liability insurance. 
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There's no way to do it. It's not like life insurance statistics 
because the variables are changing so rapidly you cannot antici-
pate them. The social lation, the new theories of legal 
liability. How are you going to predict what you are going to 
pay out eight or ten years from now when you get your price 
today, and it's all over. Your premium is collected today and 
you're still paying out eight or ten years later. There's no 
actuarial basis for it. You can make some educated guesses and 
you hope you can restrict your losses. This won't change. If 
the insurance industry is taken out of it, that is just a method 
of funding it. The underlying problems here are simply how 
many liabilities and haw much are people going to pay for it and 
whether you fund it through insurance or you go through the self-
insured method, eventually the taxpayer is going to pay for it. 
Insurance is simply a measure or a method, of course, of funding 
a large payment and you'll get it back over a long period of time 
if they stay in business. So I would like to invite the 
Committee's attention to the fact that the real problems under-
lying our dilemma today, we feel, lie in these areas of govern-
mental immunity, the erosion of it. We think that there 
obviously are good reasons to leave a liability in for public 
agencies. We believe that our whole social and legal structure 
depends on individual responsbility, but we do believe there are 
special cases for public agencies and school districts and I'd 
like to take issue with the one speaker who said that there 
should be no difference if you • . • Why should public schools 
be any different than private schools. Well, I don't think they 
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should. That's not the issue. I don't think either private 
schools or public schools and their teachers should be subjected 
to an unreasonable rule of supervision. When you consider some 
of the things that the courts seem to think that a teacher can 
supervise on his playground, it is incredible. There is no way 
they can defend themselves on supervision. I do think that that 
is a special situation. There•s no difference in a truck 
driving or a bus for a public school or a private company. I 
wouldn•t argue that for a moment. They have the same liabilities. 
There are particular areas though, I think, that have to be 
restricted. I might make some specific suggestions as a result 
of some of our experiences in claims and lawsuits. One of the 
areas that has caused the companies to retreat from insurance of 
public school districts is this errors and omissions area and 
this is a very muddled situation. In the State of California, 
of course with our codes, we have two codes that seem to impinge 
on this particular errors and omissions area. One of them is the 
Government Code Section 990; the other is the Education Code 
Section 1017. Section 990 as you know is permissive and Section 
1017 is mandatory. There is no consensus at all among law firms, 
among legal counsel for insurance companies about what these two 
statutes mean. And there is no one so far that we have been able 
to find out in four years of testimony that knows any case law 
that interprets this. However, the major underwriters feel that 
both of these statutes give them a wide-open policy, tantamount 
to errors and omissions insurance or malpractice if you want. 
Certainly I think that, without getting too much into the tail 
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here and taking up your time, I might recommend that the 
consider at least in the matter of Education Code Sect 10 
that take out the provision that the district mandator 
liab ies of their agents for acts and s 
in employees that is, for acts and omissions. That they 
insure them. They may pick them up and I certainly go 
the first speaker who pointed out that we're leaving some of 
these trustees and employees out in the cold when it comes to 
ive damages individually. I think it's a serious 
We have a case in our own county where three were judged to be 
liable for $160,000 in punitive damages, but I'd like to 
the recommendation that you consider taking out the 
provision of providing insurance under Section 1017. If 
that, then perhaps some of the underwriters who are now fr 
writing these kind of contracts will come back in and wr 
without feeling they are granting errors and omissions coverage. 
a 1 to strongly underscore agree with 
summary of the Citizens' Commission on Tort Reform to come 
some of schedule on contingency fees. I suppose 
the that Dr. Preston and this committee have that 
met unwarranted claims and awards probably means that 
's attorney gets 35-40% of a $1 million j 
that's too much. That's not serving the society well. So 
th that we are certainly strongly supportive of some 
schedule that might correspond to the probate schedule. wou 
like to also suggest that Mr. Moore's idea of an assigned r 
pool for insureds is a good one and perhaps is fair -- that 
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companies doing business here should take their pro rata share 
of this. The punitive damage situation is a serious one for 
anyone who sits in a public agency and I did at one time sit on 
the city counc and I wouldn't care to expose myself again if 
I didn't have coverage fully for all kinds of actions including 
punitive damages. In conclusion, I would just like to say that 
there are lots of ways to skin a cat and we would encourage all 
of the ideas and thinking that we can get, but remember that the 
basic underlying problems here have to do with this expanding 
area and more expensive area of liability awards and if the 
insurance industry can't be used to solve this, then we are 
going to have to go out and find some other people who are 
experienced and capable to carry on. Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN BEVERLY: Any questions? 
ASSEMBLYMAN McVITTIE: I agree, Mr. Sanders, there are 
lots of ways to skin a cat1 but I'm not so sure that all cats 
should be skinned. In terms of the problem of supervision of 
playgrounds, and I've seen many cases where children do get 
hurt and there is a real question as to whether or not teachers 
or some custodian should be out there enforcing order, aren't 
those questions usually left to a jury and members of the 
community to decide whether or not there has been adequate 
supervision? 
MR. SANDERS: Well, I don't suppose that you're sug-
gesting that every jury award was the best kind of judgment. I 
certainly don't think that's been the case and some of the 
appellate cases would agree with that. 
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ASSEMBLYMAN McVITTIE: You haven't answered my question 
though. 
MR. SANDERS: Do I agree that the jury is sufficient 
to judge whether they have supervision or not? 
ASSEMBLYMAN McVITTIE: No, that's not my question. 
MR. SANDERS: What was your question again? 
ASSEMBLYMAN McVITTIE: When we talked about super-
vision problems and scope of supervision,that determination is 
generally made by the jury. In other words, a group of community 
members sit there and they d~cide whether or not the employees of 
the school district properly supervise these out-of-school 
activities of the children entrusted to the school district 
during school hours. 
MR. SANDERS: Well,no, I don't agree with that. I 
think that the instructions given by the court oftentimes impose 
a duty on the teacher that is unreasonable. And so the jury has 
nothing to do but go with the judge's instruction about what 
duties that teacher owes. And I'm saying that I think that 
those are unreasonable in today's climate. Are you aware that 
the staffs have been cut down in most schools that they don't 
have the money anymore to even look over the playground? 
ASSEMBLYMAN McVITTIE: That's something to argue with 
you about. What specific BAJI instruction are you referring to? 
You are speaking about instructions which the court gives to the 
jury in terms of supervision.I'm not aware of any specific one. 
Maybe you can tell me about it. 
MR. SANDERS: Isn't it the case that when the judge 
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instructs about law and what the duties are of, in this case, 
the teacher that they give them some kind of instruction about 
what reasonable care is? After all, the negligence is based on 
supervision, isn't ? 
ASSEMBLYMAN McVITTIE: Yes, that's precisely my point. 
Anyway that's why I went back to this about arguing. Indeed, 
very broad principles are given to the jury in terms of instruc-
tion here and the community members decide whether or not the 
school district has been negligent in supervising these children. 
As you pointed out, there are financial problems throughout the 
state and school districts have them. But when you shortchange 
the public and you put the children out there with all their 
activities without supervision,you may be responsible for the 
resultant injuries that occur when the kids get into a gang 
fight, let's say, on the school grounds and there's absolutely 
no supervision to break it up. So we have to be careful sometimes 
with the situations that we've pointed out here. 
MR. SANDERS: Pardon me, Mr. McVittie. But wouldn't a 
gang fight be something that you would think is probably uncon-
trollable by a couple of lady teachers? And it does happen. 
Lawsuits come out of it. Is that reasonable? 
ASSEMBLYMAN McVITTE: That's precisely the point. The 
members of the community side with the jury and that's why we have 
this system so that people like you or myself don't decide that 
question, but if the person is injured you have community peers. 
I suppose that's the purpose of the jury system. Now if we go 
along with your suggestion,maybe we ought to get rid of the jury 
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system. 
MR. SANDERS: No, no, no! My suggestion is that we 
delineate these and restore some immunities to these teachers. 
Give them some elbow room. 
ASSEMBLYMAN McVITTIE: O.K., you still want the jury 
system? 
MR. SANDERS: Of course. I never made a recommendation 
to abolish the jury system. 
ASSEMBLYMAN McVITTIE: I'm not so sure that we should 
have it in these cases. 
MR. SANDERS: Well, that's not my point of view. 
ASSEMBLYMAN McVITTIE: O.K., fine, at least you support 
it. The other point is that in terms of mandatory insurance of 
the agents of a school district, you're saying that the school 
district should not be bound to insure their agents. Now what 
happens if the agent or school district has a judgment against 
him or her or it. Is there automatic recourse by the agent back 
to the district so the district would have to pay that out of its 
general funds without having the benefit of insurance protection? 
MR. SANDERS: Yes. I think that the thinking, and I'm 
not trying to take on the issue of that type, I think it's wise 
that the districts reimburse all of its I use the word agents. 
Actually I think its limited to members of the board, officers 
and employees. I think it's reasonable the district should 
reimburse them for all authorized actions if it's not insurable 
and all I'm suggesting is that by opening up this ambiguous 
language of Code 1017 Section 82, the companies feel that they 
-121-
are writing far more the basic insurance contract intended 
to write in personal injury, bodily injury, property damage. 
This thing extends into errors and omissions for the adminis-
tration and trustees. It gets them into a full errors and 
omissions policy because the language says they shall insure 
against. If they say they shall indemnify their own people, I 
think that's fine, but to make it part of the insurance contract 
is driving insurers out of the market. 
ASSEMBLYMAN McVITTIE: One of the reasons it's part of 
the contract is that if the agent sustains any loss, the agent 
can then turn around against the school district. So since the 
school district wants indemnification initially, it seems to me 
the purpose of the state legislation is to protect the public 
finances -- the school district's funds by requiring insurance 
for all the risks that the school district would be responsible 
for, including the risks of negligence of its agents. 
MR. SANDERS: Yes, but now you can't get people to 
insure it. In other words, you are driving the very people out 
that you wanted to have insuring them, and now they are not in-
suring other act ies. 
ASSEMBLYMAN McVITTIE: Well, your alternative then is 
a hybrid form of self-insurance because what you're suggesting 
then is that the school district, for its direct activities, 
would be insured and for the incidental liability, the vicarious 
liability of its agents, employees, officers and so forth, you 
would be self-insured. 
MR. SANDERS: Well, let me, if I may, pursue that a 
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moment. This is a very good point -- case in point. The 
largest property insurer of public school districts in California 
today has decided that they will continue to insure school 
districts, but they are going to reduce their limits to an 
unreasonably low limit which leaves us with a problem of pro-
viding the excess or $300,000. Because of this very Code, they 
feel that they can't write insurance without being sucked in on 
this Code because it is compulsory and it can very well be 
interpreted to say that this thing requires that they pick up 
this kind of liability. But there is another series of policies 
we call "trustees' liability policies., that are available that do 
insure errors and omissions coverage. We can't separate those 
two because we can't get some kind of interpretation that the 
district, if they didn't have to insure, may insure against 
errors and omissions, and that policy is available as a separate 
kind of policy. But the other carrier who's writing all the 
other kind of liability -- playgrounds, vehicles, trucks, 
busses, this kind of thing -- they don't want to get involved 
in this thing so they are making unreasonable requirements on 
limits. If we could take that mandatory language out, we could 
provide both policies. We could permissively insure the errors 
and omissions coverage with one company and all the rest of it 
with another company. 
ASSEMBLYMAN McVITTIE: Finally, in terms of the 
contingent fees, you are suggesting a schedule such as the 
probate schedule where it's obvious that the attorney gets his 
fee regardless of the result. It's based on the amount 
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involved. Do you think it's fair for a person to hire an attorney 
on a personal injury case and let's say the claim for damages is 
$1 million and the attorney loses the case and you still have to 
pay a fee of let's say $65,000 as you would in a probate case? 
A guaranteed fixed fee as you have in probate? 
MR. SANDERS: You mean that he would incur costs of 
$65,000? 
ASSEMBLYMAN McVITTIE: That's what you're suggesting 
by a probate schedule. 
MR. SANDERS: You're saying you pay whether you lose 
or win? 
ASSEMBLYMAN McVITTIE: Just like in probate. 
MR. SANDERS: Well, then I'll restrict my remarks to 
meaning only the arithmetic scale. I didn't mean that they would 
recover if they lost the case. 
ASSEMBLYMAN McVITTIE: Are you saying keep the contin-
gent fee system, but cut the attorney down from a third to 
perhaps 6% of the recovery on a declining scale as they have in 
probate? 
MR. SANDERS: Well, I'm not trying to come up with a 
magical formula of what a plaintiff's attorney fee should be 
a $1 million case. I see that this Committee has suggested 40% 
of the first $50,000 and 25% of the remaining. I think that 
would be a great step forward. 
that. 
ASSEMBLYMAN McVITTIE: This Committee hasn't suggested 
MR. SANDERS: No, the Citizens' Commission on Tort 
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Reform. 
ASSEMBLYMAN McVITTIE: Oh, I see. 
MR. SANDERS: I think that would be a great step 
forward and I'll abandon my analogy of the probate. I wasn't 
aware you could lose a probate case. 
ASSEMBLYMAN McVITTIE: You take your fee off the top. 
CHAIRMAN BEVERLY: Any further questions? Mr. Sanders, 
we have your letter to Assemblyman Hayden. Incidentally, he's 
not here because he's got another committee that's meeting at 
the same time. 
MR. SANDERS: He's already read the letter. 
CHAIRMAN BEVERLY: Yes, I'm sure he has. Thank you 
very much. Next on the agenda is Mr. Robert Walters, the City 
of San Diego Risk Manager. Mr. Walters. 
MR. ROBERT WALTERS: Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentle-
men. It's getting rather late so I'll try to be brief. My 
name is Bob Walters. I'm the Risk Manager for the City of San 
Diego. I think I probably have more good news to bring than 
anything else. I would like to go on record that the City of 
San Diego is perfectly comfortable with the statutes as they 
exist. We wouldn't want to see them lessened. We'd like to see 
them strengthened,but it works alright the way we are. How did 
we get into this position which seems to be somewhat unique? 
SENATOR RUSSELL: How are you? Are you self-insured? 
MR. WALTERS: We are totally. In 1968, I think, we 
saw the writing on the wall that the insurance industry was in 
trouble and therefore we thought we would be in trouble. So 
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commencing in 1970 we elected to take a large self-insured 
retention and at the same time take a very serious look at this 
whole process called risk management. In the subs seven 
years, we have worked out a complete broad spectrum of risk 
management applying to the City, to the legislative aspects, to 
the managerial aspects, to the supervisorial aspects and gener-
ally risk management is an integral part of everything that goes 
on in the City. I don't mean to say that we are gadflying in 
the City, but we are required to have our input into any mana-
gerial or legislative decision that's made so that we can at 
least put a price tag on it. As a result of this, our position 
has become so comfortable that commencing office of this year we 
went completely bare without hardly blinking an eye. We have in 
the meantime built a fairly substantial reserve fund to fall back 
on in the event we need it. But, contrary to the horror stories 
we've heard, we find that liability risk is rather predictable. 
So predictable, in fact, that we budget for it annually. And 
only one year in the seven that we've been self-insured have we 
gone over budget. That was only $25,000 and we're talking about 
the second largest city in the State now. The total cost of this 
program last fiscal year -- well, this fiscal year -- was a little 
bit over a million dollars, that includes salaries, losses paid, 
legal fees, everything you can think of, gasoline and so on. If 
we were to insure that program down to the first dollar, I am 
assured by my good friend Pat Moore over here that it would 
probably cost in excess of $3 million. We think we've got a 
handle on the thing, but I think that one of the problems that 
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faces so many other publ ent ies that 
insure it and forget it. That doesn't 
that's what the basic problem is. You've 
risk management process into whole process of 
matter what kind of government you're running. Br 
our position. We're comfortable. We're not ng 
lar problems and we prefer to see statutes rema 
We would prefer to see perhaps some of the immuni es that 
been eroded away brought back. We certainly don't want 
the 100-day statute eroded away. We find that, 
testimony of the Trial Lawyers Associat , an 
Government is an awfully complicated business. There 
going on all over the place and if we didn't some 
a timeclock on this thing, we would be 
100-day statute proves that to us. I was over A 
week working with the City of Scotsdale and they have 
there. It's just two years. They don't know what 
they've got a lawsuit involving a car 
section where there was a stop sign 
event took place a year and a half 
one day before the two-year statute was up. 
what they are going to do about 
and that's what I don't want to see 
to briefly address myself, in add 
to the point that there's been an awful lot 
went 
about trial work, lawyers legal work and so on. 
this as a legal problem. We think a 
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It arises out of management operations and there 's up to 
management to resolve it. We therefore have our own sta 
and we treat this like a management Only of al 
claims were running around $2,500 a year, only 6% go to form 
of litigation and only .006 ever go to trial, and we haven t st 
one yet. One of the problems . 
CHAIRMAN BEVERLY: We have a question. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: On that particular point, I assume 
that somebody gets injured and they file action against you, or 
they tell you they're going to and you have to assume as some-
body said this morning, I guess it was from L.A., that have 
to work up the case just as though they are going to go to court 
on the whole thing and then they mount up the evidence 
show the other side that he doesn't have a leg to stand on or 
then they say well, maybe you do, so let's settle out of court. 
He indicated that that was quite costly and time-consuming. 
Don't you have to go through the same kinds of things 
who are attorneys? 
MR. WALTERS: Yes, sir, but we have our own 
claims adjusters and claims adjusters are a lot less 
than attorneys. I believe the old say one cla 
can put three lawyers out of business if he 1 s good 
we think we've got that kind of staff aboard. We invest 
everything. We don't wa for a cla to come We 
gate it when the incident occurs. We are 1 on 24-hour not 
to go out and do these things. We like to get there 
body is still warm and we do start investigations 
-128-
te 
ti-
• 
after the fact so we're hopefully not caught in the dark. 
Another thing we do not engage in, which I heard mentioned 
before -- I believe you brought it up -- this business of 
routine denials. I think this is a horrible way to run a 
program. 
ASSEMBLYMAN McVITTIE: You admit that it does exist 
though. 
MR. WALTERS: Yes, it does, but we don't do it. If 
the claim has merit, we won't deny it. We'll only deny it if 
we really want to get the clock ticking on the thing, but then 
we usually explain to the other party why. This whole process 
we've found is a people massaging program. It really is. 
These are people with problems. We're a municipal government, 
therefore it's up to us to try and resolve these problems in 
the interest of equity to both of us. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Wait a minute. On that particular 
point, I perceive, yes, it's a people problem. O.K., I'm 
injured and for whatever reason I think you're at fault and 
I'm going to get you. I'm going to get recompense. So I hire 
an attorney or an attorney comes to me. And now it's sort of 
interfaced between my attorney and your risk management 
people. The attorney's job is to represent me and do the best 
he can for me as well as himself. So how do you massage me to 
get me to calm down or whatever to take this out of court and 
solve it more simply? 
MR. WALTERS: Alright, when you consider your case, 
we failed. Our problem was to get to you and massage you so 
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you wouldn't go to a lawyer. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: How do you find out about that I'm 
going to sue you, that there's a problem I go to a 
lawyer? You mean you hear about the ace 
MR. WALTERS: We hear about the accident. In fact we 
review every vehicular accident. As an example, we review 
every vehicular accident that takes place within the City of 
San Diego every day. I'm not talking about vehicle accidents 
involving City cars, I'm talking about every vehicular accident. 
If we see something that possibly will bring us into a road 
design problem or something like that or there is a question 
that the city was liable or if it was a case where a police car 
rear-ended somebody we get right out there on that thing and 
start talking to people. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Oh, I see. Thank you. 
MR. WALTERS: You can't ignore it. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Once you get to the attorney wou 
you say that it becomes much more difficult to do what 're 
suggesting? 
MR. WALTERS: Not necessarily. We found that most 
the bar association members our area are pretty 
people. Some aren't. Very few. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Are you the hospital bus s? 
MR. WALTERS: No, sir. 
CHAIRMAN BEVERLY: Mr. McVittie. 
ASSEMBLYMAN McVITTIE: Mr. Walters, were you here 
this morning when Professor Van Alstyne ted that the 
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100-day statute be modified to allow the filing of a late claim 
within one year from the accrual of the cause of action unless 
the public entity could show some type of prejudice. 
MR. WALTERS: Yes, I was here. 
ASSEMBLYMAN McVITTIE: If there's no prejudice to the 
City of San Diego, in terms of fairness, why shouldn't that 
injured person be allowed up to one year as they would have if 
they were injured by a nonpublic agency? 
MR. WALTERS: I think it would create somewhat of an 
administrative monster to change it to that sort of thing. It 
was alleged that we've already got an administrative monster. 
I don't see that at all. Again, I think that the primary pur-
pose of that 100-day statute is to keep things timely so we can 
keep the clock ticking, so we can keep things going so we don't 
have to end up with the City of Scottsdale's problems. 
ASSEMBLYMAN McVITTIE: What do you mean? Give me an 
example. Because I can tell you that when I was with the city 
that we were notified of an accident and we'd go ahead and turn 
it in routinely to the carrier. And frankly the filing of the 
100-day notice was irrelevant to the carrier. It was probably 
out there investigating it and perhaps trying to settle it and 
these notices were simply something that we used them to, 
frankly, delay any file settlement or resolution of a pattern. 
MR. WALTERS: No, we're not using the 100-day statute 
in that way. In fact, we help people file their 100-day 
statutory claims. We actually tell them how to do it, just so 
it's on the books. What I'm interested in . 
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ASSEMBLYMAN McVITTIE: 
prejudice if f 5 months months or after 
the accident? You re aware of 
you're invest 's 
MR. WALTERS: We're not 
cases where it would be impossible to 
much later. 
ASSEMBLYMAN McVITTIE: But that's 
that the Professor pointed out. And those 
was prejudice, they'd be barred 
absent prejudice to publ ent 
agree with the Professor that they 
they do in all their cases. 
MR. WALTERS: I'm not 
on this one. I personally 
is, but I have no terribly 
changed because we don't 
ASSEMBLYMAN McVITTIE: 
CHAIRMAN BEVERLY: Senator 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Is s 
Assemblyman s ta 
away from it tell us that 
But if you do go to court 
possible and es to 
br 
to f 
Mo 
problem the memory of ses as to 
Does that make the more d t? 
MR. WALTERS: Yes, 
de a 
at 
the 
se few 
e the 
tances where there 
a 
sa 
to 
do 
s f 
so 
0 
cla But 
to 
down 
rema 
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stop sign that is no longer there because the street was 
changed. Yes, essentially that's it. Incidentally, we waive 
the statute very frequently • . . 
ASSEMBLYMAN McVITTIE: Most don't. 
MR. WALTERS: In the interest of equity. If it's our 
fault, we ought to be taking care of it. 
ASSEMBLYMAN McVITTIE: That's precisely what the Pro-
fessor was pointing out this morning that once there is some 
prejudice why not have a waiver much like relief from default 
to the surprise mistake or excusable neglect. Why not in terms 
if you're seeking justice, why use this 100-day claim period as 
a sword to deny or defeat legitimate claims? 
MR. WALTERS: I agree with you. It's been very much 
misused. 
CHAIRMAN BEVERLY: Justice Thompson. 
JUSTICE THOMPSON: Is there any way to make this kind 
of device or this model of risk management available to the 
small public entity? 
MR. WALTERS: There has been a lot of talk of pooling 
it. I don't like the word pooling at all. It doesn't fit. 
sort of implies you're going to pick up the other fellow's 
liability. But there have been some efforts being made to 
establish joint powers ventures with small cities. The small 
cities of San Diego County are in the process of doing this 
right now, of forming a paper joint powers venture. And then 
they are planning currently on contracting us, the City of 
It 
San Diego who has already invented the wheel, to do their work 
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for them. And I be done. 
JUSTICE THOMPSON: Is there any legisla 
MR. WALTERS: I t s a 
that legislation just went through. It was sort of c 
legislation. 
CHAIRMAN BEVERLY: Apparently there was a legis 
that the doctors were supporting as I understand I a 
conversation with a representative of the 44 c Southern 
California that are trying to put that together. I 
it was a Chel bill. Alright, anything further? Al 
hello to the mayor. Thank you very much. Thank 
and gentlemen for participating. We appreciate 
Chairman Knox will be back next month to so the 
Hearing adjourned. 
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PRESENTATION APPENDIX I 
MADE ON BEHALF OF THE CALIFORNIA ASSOCIATION OF SCHOOL BUSINESS OFFICIALS 
TO THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON TORT LIABILITY 
AT A HEARING HELD ON OCTOBER 31, 1977 
SAC~ffiNTO, CALIFOR~IA 
The opportunity to appear before the Joint Legislative Committee on Tort 
Liability as a representative of the California Association of School Business 
Officials (CASBO) is sincerely appreciated. CASBO has been instrumental in research-
ing problem areas in school administration and seeking legislative remedy where 
warranted. The Association represents most school districts throughout California 
and is concerned with the problems facing all districts in the area of liability 
insurance protection. 
The current difficulties faced by school districts in sec~ring adequate liability 
protection has reached a critical stage and costs have reached a point where they 
represent a catastraphic drain on funds which should be used in the instructional 
program. We observe continued evidence of rate increase which are resulting in fin-
ancial difficulties for school districts. These increases range from 100% to as much 
as 600 - 800% over the cost of insurance a year ago. Some specific indications of 
escalating costs for school district liability insurance are reflected in the following: 
Fullerton 
Alhambra 
Placentia 
Santa Barbara 
Simi Valley 
San Mateo UHSD 
Premium for 1975-76 
" "current year 
$28,000 
203,000 with 4~ million dollars lesser 
coverage. 
Premium increase of 300% over previous year. 
Premium for 1976-77 105,055 
" 
II 1977-78 206,371 
Premium tripled over previous year. 
Premium for 1974-75 70,621 
Premium for current year 517,000 
Premium for 1975-76 78,000 w/$10,000 deductible 
II II 1977-78 352,000 w/$100,000 deductible 
In my own district the increased premium for insurance alone used 35% of the. total 
increase in income for the district without considering inflation increases for any 
other purpose. 
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In addition to the serious increases in premium costs, many districts are 
forced to absorb the payment of primary claims through the implementation of deductible 
provisions. The Los Angeles Unified School District, as an example, must absorb the 
first million dollars of each claim and pay a premium of approximat 000 000 
year for coverage applying to claims in excess of $1,000,000. 
There is a serious limitation in the excess market, resulting in an inordinate 
increase in charges for higher limits of protection needed by school districts 
California. In addition, insurance carriers have restricted their underwrit 
the application of exclusions which are unacceptable to California school districts. 
These include refusal to cover athletic activities, medical malpractice , mob 
violence or riot, and similar areas for which it ts imperative that school districts 
have adequate protection. Schools in the South Bay areas of Southern have 
been forced to eliminate scuba diving, trampoline and motorcycle driving instructions, 
and are contemplating elimination of driver training classes because of the 
increase in rates and the difficulties in securing coverage. Whether or not agree 
with these programs in the public schools, the decision on school and 
more, is being made by the insurance carrier, not by school boards or 
Not withstanding the increase in premium costs, insurance carriers still consider 
rates as inadequate and do not feel that additional increases in will 
the problem. An executive of one of the foremost writers of 
for California school districts has indicated the possibility of not 
in California in the coming year. Since there are few companies in the market 
such coverage, this action would escalate the crisis in the of 
We find it a consensus of established authority in the liability insurance field that 
solution to the problem is possible without tort reform. The problem cannot be solved 
solely by rate adjustment. In order to interest insurance carriers and secure 
coverage for our liability expenditure, immediate reform of the tort 
imperative. It would be presumptious of me to recommend specific reforms to relieve 
schools of this intolerable burden; however, I would like to suggest areas 
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consideration: 
. 
1. A system of mandatory arbitration applicable to all students in public 
schools should be considered in order to reduce the high cost of litigation. 
2. A method should be adopted to preclude unfair enrichment. 
3. A type of penalty assessment or charges for litigation expenses should be 
available at the discretion of the court in cases of unsuccessful litigation. 
4. It should be required that a defendant school district be notified when a 
law suit is filed whether or not service is made. This would preclude the 
need for carrying of reserves where a court action is not filed within the 
six months statutory period. 
5. Limit damage awards for bodily injury to schedules such as are provided for 
employees under the Worker's Compensation statutes in those situations where 
the school district is found to be at fault. If the compensation provided to 
an injured worker is deemed adequate under the law, it should follow that 
similar compensation is adequate to others sustaining injury in the broader 
context of the activities of California school districts. Labor Co9e 
provisions include life time benefits where such is determined, deserved or 
needed. 
The California Association of School Business Officials considers tort reform the 
most important factor in maintaining a viable market for school district liability 
insurance protection. It is essential in order to maintain adequate instructional and 
recreational programs in California school districts. 
I 
Again. thank you for this opportunity to present this aspect of the greater problem 
to you. 
Wayne Preston, Ed.D. 
Chairman 
CASBO State Risk Management Research Committee 
(Assistant Superintendent - Operations 
San Mateo Union High School District) 
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Los Angeles City Unified School District 
WILLIAM J. JOHNSTON 
Superintendent of Schools 
JAMES B. TAYLOR 
Deputy Superintendent 
October 25, 1977 
Joint Legislative Committee 
on Tort Liability 
11th and "L" Building, Suite 950 
Sacramento, California 95814 
Business Division 
(625-5361) 
ROBERT G. BARNES 
Business Manager 
M. REDOGLIA 
Business l'Aanager 
Attention: The Honorable Robert Beverly, Vice Chairman 
Gentlemen: 
This paper is presented on behalf of the Los Angeles Unified School District 
to express our concern over the deteriorating market for school district liability 
insurance and the escalation in premium costs for coverage essential to the pro-
tection of school district assets. 
The problem is of particular concern since school districts have a tax revenue 
limitation and funds expended for liability coverage must be taken from money 
that would otherwise be available for instructional purposes. The following 
breakdown of liability insurance costs is indicative of the serious financial 
implications that have developed in just the past four years: 
Year Coverage 
1974-75 $15,000,000 
1975-76 15,000,000 
1976-77 50,000,000 
1977-78 50,000,000 
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Premium 
$600,000 (no deductible) 
330,000 (deductible 
$250,000 per claim 
with maximum District 
liabi lity--$-750, 000) 
786,000 (deductib1e 
$250,000 per claim 
with unlimited maximum 
District liability) 
948,000 (deductible 
$1,000,000 per claim 
with unlimited maximum 
District liability) 
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In addition to the costs, it is necessary for the District over 
$2,000,000 in a restricted reserve to for future claims. 
We have experienced a constant depletion of the market for both primary and excess 
liability coverage and have had difficulty in securing carriers, notwithstanding 
the substantial increase in premium. There is a trend toward more restrictive 
underwriting limiting coverage in areas where school districts are high vulner-
able. It is tncreasingly difficult to secure coverage for athletics and 
against such areas as riot or mob violence. 
It is apparent that the present situation cannot be resolved sole by rate 
adjustment. It is the consensus of executives in the insurance industry that no 
solution is possible without tort reform. Immediate reform of the tort liabi 
system is imperative. 
Potential solutions involved in tort reform would include the following sugges-
tions which are submitted for the consideration of the Committee: 
1) There is need for reaffirmation of established immunities and increased 
protection for school districts in those areas not directly associated 
with historical classroom instruction. This involves specifically, 
the increasing number of field trips, limited ability of school district 
to provide transportation, and the exposure from use of student-driven 
vehicles. School districts need immunity from the increased liabili 
exposure resulting from off-campus activities. 
2) There is a need for immunity for school districts from liability 
involved in efforts to control violence and from actions necessary 
to prevent the carrying of weapons on school premises. 
3) There is a need for removal of exceptions from the claims fi 
of limitations. 
4) A type of penalty assessment or charges for li expense should 
be available at the discretion of the Court in cases of unsuccess 
litigation. 
5) Damage awards for bodily injury should be limited to schedules 
provided for employees under the Workers' Compensation Statutes 
in those situations where the school district is found to be at faul • 
If the compensation provided to an injured worker is deemed 
under the law, it should follow that similar compensation is 
to anyone sustaining injury in connection with the educational respon-
sibilities of California school districts. Labor Code provisions 
include lifetime benefits where such need is determined. 
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6) A proposed constitutional amendment should be encouraged which would 
provide legal authority for the establishment of a reciprocal basis 
for the insuring of California school districts. 
It appears essential that tort reform be accomplished in the most expeditious 
manner possible in order to avoid a crisis in the insuring of California school 
districts. The Committee may be assured of our utmost cooperation in efforts 
to develop a reasonable and practical solution which will work to the benefit 
of all concerned • 
Very respectfully, 
~hjtJ?-1~ 
CLIFFORD H. ALLEN 
Insurance Supervisor 
CHA:eca 
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APPENDIX III 
CITY of LIVERl\.f()RE 
2250 FIRST STREET e LIVERMORE, CA 94550 8 (415) 447·2100 
THE OFFICE OF JOHN F. STALEY, ESQ. 
The Honorable Floyd Mori 
State Capital Building 
Sacramento, California 95814 
Dear Assemblyman Mori; 
COUNCILMAN 
It is my understanding that the Assembly held a committee meeting this 
week on the subject of insurance industry regulation and reform. I would be 
very happy to add my comments but unfortunately I was not able to be present 
at the meeting on Monday. I hope it is not too late for my comments on the 
subject to be received. 
For the benefit of the members of the committee I would like to identify 
myself as a City Councilman and an attorney. I have an active trial practice 
but I am not blind to the serious need for reforms in the entire tort liabil-
ity, insurance regulation, and court reform area. 
The purpose of this letter,however, is to address two specific facits of 
a very complex problem. That is the regulation of rates set by the Lnsurance 
companies, and a limit of liability for governmental entities. 
It is my understanding that the insurance companies and the insurance in-
dustry have vigorously fought any attempt to require them to disclose their 
loss rate or any of the facts upon which they base their increased rates. 
These companies cry that they are being hit with huge losses that they were 
incapable of forecasting and therefore they must cover these losses or poten-
tial losses by increasing premiums. 
As a practical matter any person who drives a car, owns a home or has a 
profession and is capable of earning a living with his or her labors are re-
quired to have a multiplicity of liability insurance coverages. The cost of 
insurance coverage, not only to the individual but to municipalities like the 
City of Livermore has gone up a staggering amount. Depending upon the partic-
ular area of liability involved, the City of Livermore's premiums have doubled 
and tripled in the space of a single year. We were told at the time our re-
newals came up last year that we virtually had to beg to have the policy re-
newed at two and three times the previous years price. 
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has narrowed sometimes to one company. 
Several major from the of liab 
be- cause of the potential those that remain to set 
their own premiums, tion. 
We then have the following elements operating in the insurance 
at the present time. 
1. Little if any real rate .(there is competition for the 
lowest risk insureds) 
2. The virtual necessity for the particular product, i.e. insurance 
coverage, equating almost the need for gas, water, and electricity. 
3. Fantastic increases in premiums with no evidence that these 
bear any relationship to the actual expenses of the particular service. 
4. An extremely profitable return to insurance companies based on their 
dividend rates. 
While I am not a strong advocate of government intervention in unneces-
sary areas, nor unnecessary regulation, I believe it is time that we have a 
regulatory agency that oversees the rate setting practices of the insurance 
industry. There is no other effective means to protect the public from the 
potential, if not actual, abuses that this situation creates. 
As another thought that has occurred to me on the subject of governmental 
immunity from suit, an issue that is very closely tied up with the insurance 
company regulation and need for increased rates. I would suggest the possi-
bility of putting an absolute limit on the liability of the governmental agen-
cies for any particular negligent act. 
The original concept of governmental immunity came into confl the 
basic theory of the law of tort liability in that a person who is 
through the fault of another should be to the full extent 
injuries. As a practical matter most individuals carry insurance of 
limits of liability, but few exceed $300,000.00 per person and the average I 
would guess is $100,000.00. It would seem to me that a law a govern-
mental entity to a given figure such as $100,000.00 per person would do 
eral things. First $100,000.00 at present rates is adequate all but a 
small number of cases. In those cases where the actual expected 
damages exceed $100,000.00 there is often more than one defendant. It would 
seem that this particular limit would then make the risks more for 
both the insurance industry and the governmental entity, and yet allow an 
adequate, if not generous recovery for the seriously 
I hope these ideas are of some interest to the committee and if you hold 
future hearings I would be pleased to appear person if I had ient 
notice so that I could schedule it. 
Very truly yours, 
J~~ 
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